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THE CASE AGAINST A RIGHT TO RELIGION-
BASED EXEMPTIONS
ELLIS WEST*
When, if ever, does the free exercise -clause of the first
amendment' give an individual or organization the right to dis-
obey with impunity a valid law of the state? This question is
being discussed with increasing frequency and intensity
because of the growing number of persons and groups who are
going to the courts and claiming such a right on the grounds
that the application of certain laws to them would burden their
free exercise of religion.2 Almost all the individuals and some
of the groups who claim such a right do so because the laws to
which they object require them to do or not to do something
that is contrary to what their religion, as they understand it,
requires them to do or not to do. Some organizations, how-
ever, ask for exemptions simply on the grounds that they are
churches or are engaged in religious activity, neither of which,
* Professor of Political Science, University of Richmond. Support for
the writing of this article was provided by the Faculty Research Committee,
University of Richmond.
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Examples: Fundamentalist parents sued to have their children in
public schools excused from having to read certain books or attend certain
classes. Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). A Jewish rabbi/chaplain
asked to be exempted from having to comply with an Air Force dress code
that prohibited his wearing a yarmulke. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503 (1986). Amish employers sought exemption from the federal law
requiring them to pay social security taxes on their employees. United States
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). Church-related schools and publishing houses
challenged the application to them of laws against racial and sexual
discrimination. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983);
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Southwestern Baptist
Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1981). For religious reasons,
an individual wanted to receive a driver's license without having to have her
picture taken and placed on the license. Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121
(8th Cir. 1984), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, Jens6n v. Quaring,
472 U.S. 478 (1985). Native American parents objected to their infant
daughter's being given a social security number as a condition of receiving
government benefits. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). For many other
examples, see Esbeck, 1986 Survey of Trends and Developments in Religious Liberty
in the Courts, 4 J.L. & RELIGION 431 (1986).
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they claim, can be regulated by the government without violat-
ing the free exercise clause.3
Ironically, the laws involved in free exercise cases are
almost never ones whose primary purpose or primary effect is
to harm religion (in general or in particular) or to discriminate
against persons or groups because of their religion. Instead,
their primary purpose or effect is to protect or promote the
health, safety, property, morals, or general welfare of the peo-
ple-generally conceded to be legitimate objectives of govern-
ment.4 The issue in such cases, therefore, is not whether the
challenged laws are constitutional, but only whether they can be
applied to those persons or groups whose exercise of religion
would, according to them, be made more difficult or impossible
were the laws to be applied to them.5 In contrast, when the
primary purpose or effect of a law is the burdening or limiting of
the exercise of religion, the Supreme Court strikes down the
law itself as a violation of the free exercise clause.6 Because
such laws have so little chance of being upheld by the Court,
they have little chance of being passed by a legislature in the
3. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 475
U.S. 1115 (1986). The alleged right of churches and other religious
organizations generally to be free of government regulation is now widely
referred to as the right to church autonomy. See Laycock, Towards a General
Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to
Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
4. Ira C. Lupu writes:
Behavior that is generally understood as religious alone is almost
never subject to direct regulation .... The collision between state
policy and free exercise [of religion] thus tends to arise
'incidentally,' and frequently quite unforeseeably .... At times, the
impact on nonmainstream religions will be the product of a
distressing insensitivity. In many other situations, however, the
government will have acted in innocence.
Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18
CONN. L. REV. 739, 773 (1986).
5. See Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free
Exercise Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217 (1973); McCrossin, General Laws, Neutral
Principles, and the Free Exercise Clause, 33 VAND. L. REV. 149 (1980); and Note,
Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities,
90 YALE L.J. 350 (1980).
6. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488 (1961); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Kedroffv.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). Laws whose primary purpose
or primary effect is discrimination against religion or a particular church can
also be struck down as violations of the free speech clause, Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (198 1), or the establishment clause, Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228 (1982).
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first place.7 Most recent free exercise cases decided by the
Court, therefore, have dealt with the issue of religion-based
exemptions from valid laws.
In deciding these cases the Supreme Court has declared
that the free exercise clause, at least under certain circum-
stances, does give individuals,8 if not organizations,9 a right to
be exempt from having to obey laws that for reasons of religion
they do not wish to obey. Moreover, it has broadly defined
"religious belief" to include whatever gives ultimate meaning
to life.'° Not surprisingly, the Court's interpretation and appli-
cation of the free exercise clause have engendered considera-
ble criticism-some persons complaining because the Court's
interpretation is too expansive," and others because its prac-
tice is not nearly as liberal as its rhetoric. 12
This Article attempts to make the case against the
Supreme Court's recent, broad interpretation of the free exer-
cise clause, that is, against the idea that persons or groups have
a constitutional right via the free exercise clause to religion-
based exemptions. The. first section summarizes the Court's
current interpretation of the free exercise clause. Then follows
an explanation of the ethical, logical, and practical problems
caused by the Court's current interpretation. The third section
reviews and evaluates the leading arguments on behalf of a
7. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause, in THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND
DEVELOPMENTS, 1982-83 71-73 (D. Opperman ed. 1984).
8. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9. Although the Court has never said that the free exercise clause gives
churches or church-related organizations a right to be exempt from the
application of valid secular laws, it has implied that the establishment clause
under certain circumstances may require the granting of such exemptions.
See Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290
(1985). This article, however, does not directly discuss the significance of
that decision or whether the establishment clause by itself does or should
serve as a basis for a right to religion-based exemptions, because the issues
raised by establishment clause decisions in this connection are essentially the
same as those raised by the Court's free exercise decisions. In other words,
for purposes of this article it will be assumed that churches as well as
individuals now have a constitutional right to religion-based exemptions, and
that most of the arguments for and against such a right are the same
regardless of which of the religion clauses or what combination of the two
might be used by the Court to generate such a right.
10. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). See infra notes 32-37
and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 144-2 10
(1972) (one of the earliest and most trenchant criticisms of the Court's
expansive reading of the free exercise clause).
12. See, e.g., Leedes, Court-Ordered Exemptions to Secure Religious Liberty, 21
U. RICH. L. REV. 335, 340 (1987).
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right to religion-based exemptions. The fourth section sum-
marizes the evidence from primary sources and recent histori-
cal scholarship on the original meaning of the phrase, "free-
exercise of religion." The Article concludes with a discussion
of the implications for church-state law in general of the
Supreme Court's adopting of a narrow interpretation of the
free exercise clause.
I. THE COURT'S RECENT INTERPRETATION OF THE FREE
EXERCISE CLAUSE
The Supreme Court has had a difficult time deciding
whether the free exercise clause requires that exemptions from
generally applicable laws be granted to religious claimants. For
most of its history, it granted no exemptions because it inter-
preted the free exercise clause as prohibiting only "govern-
mental action aimed at burdening religious practice, not
governmental action with a non-religious purpose that hap-
pened to impose upon an individual's religious practice. " 3
Then, in 1963, in the case of Sherbert v. Verner,, 4 the Court for
the first time used the free exercise clause to exempt a person
from a valid law solely because it made the exercise of her reli-
gion more difficult.' 5 In doing so, the Court enunciated the
principle that the government may not prohibit or even burden
the exercise of religion, even unintentionally or secondarily,
unless it can show that such action is necessary in order to pro-
tect a compelling state interest.' 6
13. Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause-Some Reflections on
Recent Cases, 9 N. Ky. L. REV. 265, 266 n.l 1 (1982) [hereinafter Conundrum]
(emphasis added). Cases where the Court refused to grant religious
exemptions include: Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878);
Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Cleveland v. United States, 329
U.S. 14 (1946); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). For a general
discussion of these and other free exercise cases, see Pepper, Reynolds,
Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REV.,
309, 317-26, 330-45.
14. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
15. The Court exempted the appellant from a regulation denying
unemployment compensation to those who quit work for personal reasons. It
did so because the person's personal reason for quitting work was religious:
she did not wish to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. Id. at 399-404.
16. Justice Brennan, for the Court, stated that "no showing merely of a
rational relationship to some colorable state interest" would suffice to justify
a law burdening the exercise of religion. Rather, " '[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests' give occasion for permissible limitation."
Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
A RIGHT TO RELIGION-BASED EXEMPTIONS
Although some scholars at the time said that Sherbert signif-
icantly expanded the protection afforded by the free exercise
clause, 7 the decision did not turn out to be the "revolution"
that they believed or hoped it would be. In spite of the Sherbert
rhetoric and numerous opportunities for the Supreme Court to
apply its holding in other cases,18 since 1963 there have been
only four cases' 9 in which the Court has arguably used the
"compelling state interest" test and the free exercise clause to
exempt persons from the application of a secular, neutral, gen-
eral welfare-type law.20 Moreover, those decisions have limited
significance. 2 ' According to Mark Tushnet, they have estab-
lished that a religious interest will be protected only when its
social significance is marginal. 2 In addition, in 1988 the Court
significantly narrowed its Sherbert holding when it stated that
17. For example, Marc Galanter described Sherbert as "the dawn of a
new day for religious freedom claims." Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the
United States: .4 Turning Point? 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217, 241. See also P. KAUPER,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 20, 41-43 (1964); Weiss, Privilege, Posture and
Protection: Religion in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 621 (1964).
18. The cases in which the Court has declined to protect persons whose
religious activity was allegedly burdened by a valid law include: Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971);Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974);
Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640 (1981); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Bob Jones University
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v.
Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503 (1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); and Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
19. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S.
136 (1987); and Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 109 S. Ct.
1514 (1989). InJensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985), the Court, by virtue
of a tie vote, upheld a lower court's decision to exempt a person from a
state's requirement that a person's photograph be on her driver's license.
20. For a discussion of most of the free exercise decisions since 1963,
see West, The Free Exercise Clause and the Internal Revenue Code's Restrictions on the
Political Activity of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 395, 413-
28 (1986).
21. Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the Yoder case was very
unusual, if not unique, thus implying that almost any other case that might
arise under the free exercise clause could be distinguished from it. Even so,
he noted that the decision was a close one. 406 U.S. at 215-19, 234-36. Also,
the facts in Thomas, Hobbie, and Frazee were almost identical to those in
Sherbert, in that they involved a claim for unemployment compensation. The
Frazee decision, however, did contribute to a broadening of the protection
afforded by the free exercise clause because it clearly established that a
person does not have to be a member of a religious organization in order to
be eligible for a religion-based exemption.
22. Mark Tushnet calls this "the marginality principle": "an exemption
will be provided if doing so has no socially significant consequences but not if
1990]
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"incidental effects of government programs, which may make it
more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to
coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, [do not]
require government to bring forward a compelling justification
for its otherwise lawful actions. "23 As might be expected,
scholars are now questioning the Court's commitment to its
Sherbert decision and criticizing it for being unclear and unprin-
cipled in its free exercise decisions.2"
Two reasons account for the Supreme Court's floundering
in free exercise cases. The first is that the Court is badly
divided on the issue of how much protection, if any, the free
exercise clause should afford those whose religious conduct is
threatened by a legitimate, constitutional law. Some justices, in
fact, are opposed to the entire concept of a right to religion-
based exemptions. 25 The second reason is that in free exercise
it does." Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 50 REV. OF POLITICS 628, 639
(1988).
23. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct.
1319, 1326 (1988) (emphasis added). In this case, the Court refused to stop
the building of a road near sites high in the California mountains that were
held sacred by certain groups of American Indians, even though the Court
admitted that the building of the road would make it very difficult or
impossible for the Indians to practice their traditional religion. Id. at 1327.
In holding as it did, the Court majority rejected the position, argued for by
the dissenters, that the free exercise clause "is directed against any form of
government action that frustrates or inhibits religious practice." Id. at 1329
(emphasis in original).
24. Ruti G. Teitel's comments are typical of the criticism that has been
directed at the Court:
[T]he Burger Court's approach to religion cases... [is] in a state of
flux . . . [with no] workable theory to secure individual religious
liberty .... In free exercise cases, the new accommodation doctrine
threaten[s] . . . to allow governmental, majoritarian interests to
override the interests of religious minorities .... [L]ittle appears to
be left of the longstanding "compelling interest" requirement
protective of free exercise rights.
Teitel, The Supreme Court's 1984-85 Church-State Decisions: Judicial Paths of Least
Resistance, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 651, 652, 655, 667 (1986). See also
Freed and Polsby, Race, Religion, and Public Policy: Bob Jones University v.
United States, in 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 29-30 (1984); Sheffer, The U.S.
Supreme Court and the Free Exercise Clause: Are Standards of Adjudication Possible?, 23
J. CHURCH & STATE 533 (1981); and Pepper, Conundrum, supra note 13, at 267-
68, 299-301, 303.
25. A recent example of the Court's division of opinion on the issue of
a right to religion-based exemptions is its five to four decision upholding an
Air Force regulation that had the effect of preventing an Orthodox Jew from
wearing a yarmulke while in uniform even though he claimed the rule
burdened the exercise of his religion. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503
(1986). It is clear that Justices Stevens and Rehnquist wish to return to the
Court's pre-Sherbert interpretation of the free exercise clause. See United
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cases the Court, although still claiming to use a compelling
state interest test, actually employs an ad hoc balancing test,
which favors the government as much as it does the religious
objector and thus leads to unpredictable results.2 6 Formally,
the test can be described as follows:
In each case the claimant must first make some dem-
onstration that the regulation which proscribes or
prescribes certain activities substantially burdens the
practice of the claimant's religion. Second, if such a bur-
den exists, the Court will weigh the governmental inter-
est in the regulation against the burden on free exercise
rights. [Third,] [e]ven though the governmental interest
appears to be of a sufficient magnitude to justify some
burden on religious activity, it will be held invalid unless
it burdens religious freedom no more than necessary to
promote the overriding secular interest. 2 7
What this description obscures is "the multivariate nature of
the interests on each side,"'28 that is, the various factors to be
taken into account by judges and the weight to be given to each
of them. Concerning these factors, there is considerable confu-
sion among judges and legal scholars. 29 Tushnet goes so far as
to say that the test allows judges to take into account "whatever
... they want to put into the balance."30 Because of the slip-
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1982) (J. Stevens, concurring); Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720-23 (1981) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting).
Before he retired, Chief Justice Burger was apparently won over to the
Stevens-Rehnquist position. See his plurality opinion in Bowen v. Roy, 106 S.
Ct. 2147 (1986); see also Leedes, supra note 12, at 375-76.
26. See Tushnet, supra note 22, at 631, 638-39; Leedes, supra note 12, at
342-50; and West, supra note 20, at 417-21.
27. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1079 (3d
ed. 1986).
28. Laycock, supra note 3, at 1374.
29. For example, although sincerity of belief is required of a claimant if
he wishes to win an exemption, there is disagreement over whether centrality
of belief is a requirement. Carl Esbeck says that it is not required. Esbeck,
Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations,
41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 398 (1984). Lupu, supra note 4, at 771, 774,
776, disagrees. The majority of the Court now says that it does not want to
become involved in assessing the significance of religious beliefs or practices,
but the practical effect of its taking this position is an unwillingness on its part
to grant exemptions, for it leaves the Court with the alternative of either
accepting at face value the claims of the litigants about the centrality of their
beliefs or practices, or of simply not granting an exemption. In Lyng, it chose
the latter. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1329-
30 (1988).
30. Tushnet, supra note 22, at 631. See also Lupu, supra note 4, at 768.
1990]
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pery nature of the balancing test, it is impossible to predict with
any accuracy how a court, including the Supreme Court, will
decide any particular free exercise case.3
At about the same time it was expanding the scope of pro-
tection afforded religious persons and groups by the free exer-
cise clause, the Court was also expanding the meaning of
"religion." Although it has never officially defined the scope
and meaning of "religion" for first amendment purposes, in
1961 the Court stated that there can be religions that are not
based on belief in God.32 A few years later it gave a broad,
functional definition to the word "religion" contained in the
Congressional draft laws. It held that any belief, value, or com-
mitment is religious, at least when it functions in the lives of
persons in the same way that conventional religious tenets
function in the lives of those who believe them.33 Some schol-
ars now argue that in free exercise cases the Court either does
or should use, at least implicitly, the same broad, functional
understanding of religion that it enunciated in its draft law
decisions.3 4
Other scholars have questioned the wisdom of the Court's
expansive definition of "religion"-mainly on the grounds that
it is so broad that it would allow almost any activity to be
immune from government regulation. 5 Some, moreover, have
31. According to Jesse Choper, "[the] Court has created such
confusion... in this area that not only do we not know what it is going to do
with cases like this but it does not know either." Panel Discussion, in THE
SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, 1981-82 248 (D. Opperman
ed. 1983).
32. "Among religions in this country which do not teach what would
generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism,
Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others." Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n. 11 (1961).
33. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
34. See, e.g., D. OAKS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE SUPREME COURT
116-18 (1981); Konvitz, The Problem of a Constitutional Definition of Religion, in
RELIGION AND THE STATE 147-65 (J.E. Wood, Jr. ed. 1985); Sturm,
Constitutionalism and Conscientiousness: The Dignity of Objection to Military Service, 1
J.L. & RELIGION 265 (1983); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978).
35. Thus Bette Evans writes:
If religion is defined by the function of the belief system rather than
by its content, then any ultimate system of values should qualify for
First Amendment protection. By this characterization, one whose
ultimate set of personal values is music, football, or the Democratic
party might well have a legitimate religious claim.
Evans, Contradictory Demands on the First Amendment Religion Clauses: Having It
Both Ways, 30J. CHURCH & STATE 463, 469 (1988).
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argued that the Court's adoption of a broad, functional defini-
tion of "religion" for purposes of constitutional adjudication
would mean that the government could not promote (teach)
any values or ideologies for fear of violating the establishment
clause, which has been construed as prohibiting government
sponsorship of religion. 36 Finally, it has been suggested that
the "presence" of a broad, functional definition has contrib-
uted to the courts' reluctance to grant religion-based exemp-
tions as constitutional rights. 7
In the face of these difficulties and criticisms, the Supreme
Court has basically three options for dealing with free exercise
cases. First, it can continue its present unpredictable course of
"muddling through" by using an ad hoc balancing approach.3
Second, it can attempt to breathe new life into its Sherbert deci-
sion and its "compelling state interest test" by making it much
more difficult for the government to justify withholding reli-
gion-based exemptions to those who have sincerely religious
reasons for seeking them.3" Third, the Court can repudiate the
notion of a right to religion-based exemptions and return to its
pre-Sherbert interpretation of the free exercise clause. It is the
third option that I argue for in the remainder of this Article. It
must be emphasized, however, that it is only court-ordered
exemptions as constitutional rights-not the granting of
exemptions as privileges by legislative bodies-that is being
challenged. Although the two kinds of exemptions are similar,
the argument-if it is compelling-that a right to court-ordered
exemptions is not guaranteed by the Constitution does not
necessarily imply that legislature-granted exemptions are
unconstitutional.
36. See Smith v. Board of School Commissioners, 655 F. Supp. 939
(S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11 th Cir. 1987); Evans, supra note 35, at 488-
89; Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism
and Its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1 (1978). To avoid
this problem, some scholars advocate two definitions of religion-a broad
one for the free exercise clause and a narrow one for the establishment
clause. See, e.g., Note, supra note 34, at 1083-89.
37.[W]hen "religion" has no more right to free exercise than
irreligion or any other secular philosophy, the whole newly
expanded category of "religion" is likely to diminish in significance.
When that happens, the "free exercise of religion" is not likely to be
protected to any greater extent by the no-longer-unique religion
clause than by the First Amendment's free speech provision.
D. OAKS, supra note 34, at 118-19.
38. This option is apparently favored by Leedes, supra note 12, at 349,
371.
39. See Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 299, 312.
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II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXEMPTIONS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT
Six arguments can be made against the idea that the first
amendment religion clauses give persons or churches a right to
be immune from government regulation whenever they have
religious reasons for seeking immunity. The first three argu-
ments apply to religion-based exemptions in general, whether
granted by legislatures or courts.
The first argument is that granting exemptions as constitu-
tional rights violates the principle of neutrality toward religion,
one of the most fundamental principles in the theory and law of
religious freedom.4" Justice Black gave one of the first explana-
tions of the principle when he wrote: "[The First] Amendment
requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and nonbelievers; . .. State power is no
more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor
them."'" Because it prohibits discrimination for and against
religion in general, any particular religion, or persons or
groups because of their religion or lack thereof, the principle of
government neutrality toward religion is very similar to the
idea of equal protection of the law guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment.42
Inevitably, however, when the government gives exemp-
tions to some religious persons that it does not give to all, that
constitutes special or favored treatment for their religion or for
them because of their religion. The discrimination can be
threefold in nature. First, the exempted persons or groups are
40. Lupu, supra note 4, at 766-67. The Supreme Court has said that it is
an "established principle that the Government must pursue a course of
complete neutrality toward religion." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60
(1985). See also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam);
Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 746-47 (1976) (opinion
of Blackmun, J.); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971)
(opinion of Burger, C.J.); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215-22 (1963).
41. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). The Court has
also said that the principle of neutrality "prohibits government from
abandoning secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one religion,
or on religion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious
organization." Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971).
42. See Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion Clauses, in 1981 Sup.
CT. REV. 193 (1982); Lupu, supra note 4, at 739-60; Paulsen, Religion, Equality,
and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311 (1986).
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not required to do or refrain from doing something that others
are required to do or not do. Second, exemptions to certain
persons because of their religion or to certain churches may
give those religions or churches an unfair advantage over other
religions, secular ideologies, churches, nonprofit organizations,
or businesses with which they compete for members and
money.43 The discrimination is tripled if the persons and
groups not favored with exemptions have a duty or burden,
such as taxes, shifted to them because of the exemptions given
to the religious individuals or groups.44 As Michael McConnell
has pointed out, however, "religious accommodations often,
perhaps always, impose some costs on others. Sometimes
these costs are not inconsiderable."
4 5
It is not only competitors or outsiders who may be harmed
when churches receive exemptions from laws. Members and
employees of churches are also harmed when exemptions have
the effect of depriving them of legal benefits or rights that are
available to other persons in society. For example, if because
of a church's right to autonomy its members could not sue
church officials who violate church rules, those members would
be deprived of "the legal remedies normally available to attack
unauthorized 'management' actions." 46  When granting an
exemption has such an effect, it means that the government is
guilty of favoring one part of a church over another, in viola-
tion of the principle of neutrality toward religion.47
Because of the importance of the principle of neutrality or
equality, the Supreme Court itself has struck down or modified
certain government mandated exemptions. For example, in
Larson v. Valente41 it struck down a law that imposed registra-
43. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the
Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 698-700 (1980); Lupu, supra note 4, at 765;
Marshall & Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations Under the Establishment
Clause, 47 OHIO ST. L. J. 293, 324 (1986); and McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion, in 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 37 (1986).
44. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1199-1200 (2d ed.
1988).
45. McConnell, supra note 43, at 37. Even a defender of a right to
religion-based exemptions, Douglas Laycock, recognizes that it would be
unfair to give exemptions when the effect of doing so would be to shift a
burden or duty, financial or otherwise, to others. He thus questions both the
giving of draft exemptions only to religious objectors and the Supreme
Court's decision in Sherbert, the case that first established a right to
exemptions for reasons of religion. Laycock, supra note 3, at 1414-15.
46. Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal. Judicial Resolution of Internal Church
Disputes, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1380, 1403 (1981).
47. Id. at 1403-04.
48. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
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tion and reporting requirements on some religions but not
others. In another decision, the Court invalidated a Connecti-
cut law that provided sabbath observers with an absolute right
not to work on their sabbath, and did so partially on the
grounds that such a law might well cause unequal treatment of
employees on the basis of religion.49 A third example consists
of two decisions by the Court in which it interpreted Con-
gress's draft exemption law in such a way that the exemptions
could be given not only to persons with religious reasons for
seeking the exemptions (which is what Congress actually
intended), but also to persons whose moral and philosophical
beliefs led them conscientiously to object to fighting in a war.5°
The reason the Court performed such radical surgery on the
law was because otherwise the law would have violated the
principle of neutrality and one or both religion clauses.5 '
Finally, and most recently, the Court struck down a Texas law
that granted an exemption from a sales tax to religious publish-
ing companies and to them alone, and it did so clearly on the
grounds that the law violated the principle of neutrality
because it demonstrated a preference for religious ideas.52
The second argument against government granting reli-
gion-based exemptions is a practical one: that such a policy
creates ill will and divisiveness among the American people.
America today can no longer be said to be a "religious nation."
It is a pluralistic society with many different religions and with
many persons of agnostic or atheistic bent. "Secular human-
ism" is a reality.5" It is only natural, therefore, that religious
persons and groups who receive exemptions from taxes and
laws will be resented by those who do not receive them. Such
resentment is especially likely to be directed at cults and other
diversified and multifunctional organizations engaged in activi-
ties not usually thought of as religious in nature.5" This, in
49. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046, 1051
n. 1 (1987) (explaining Thornton decision); Thornton v. Calder, 472 U.S. 703
(1985); id. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
50. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
51. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 345, 356-58, 360 (Harlan, J., concurring);
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring); Kauper, The Warren Court.
Religious Liberty and Church-State Relations, 67 MICH. L. REV. 269, 274 (1968);
Rabin, When Is a Religious Belief Religious: United States v. Seeger, and the Scope
of Free Exercise, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 231, 240-49 (1966).
52. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989).
53. See Pulley, The Constitution and Religious Pluralism Today, in LIBERTY
AND LAW 143-55 (R.A. Wells & T.A. Askew eds. 1987).
54. Robbins, New Religious Movements on the Frontier of Church and State, in
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turn, may make cooperative social and political endeavors
much more difficult at a time when a sense of community is
already very weak in this country.55 The ill will generated by
the granting of exemptions will also do little to help the cause
of religion in general or the causes of those persons or groups
receiving the exemptions. 56
Religion-based exemptions are undesirable for a third rea-
son. They encourage false and deceptive claims, many of
which are granted. The history of existing exemptions given to
churches by our tax laws bears witness to the scope of this
problem. Increasingly, persons motivated by nothing more
than greed pretend to be religious or to be organized as
churches in order to take advantage of religion-based exemp-
tions.57 Even genuine religious groups may be tempted to dis-
guise some of their secular activities as religious in order that
they might not fall under government regulation.5" The grant-
ing of such false claims not only is unfair but exacerbates the
problem of ill will caused by religion-based exemptions in gen-
eral. The courts, of course, in applying exemptions have the
right to investigate a claimant's sincerity, but the problems in
making correct and fair judgments in this area are very serious
CULTS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW 8-10 (T. Robbins, W. Shepard &J. McBride
eds. 1985).
55. See Wells, Recovering the Mind of the Constitution, in LIBERTY AND LAW,
supra note 53, at 157-74.
56. Although the nature and extent of the harm that might be caused to
religion can only be a matter of speculation, the following admonition by Carl
Esbeck is worth noting:
Religious bodies must be sensitive to large elements of the public
who are already overly cynical about the role of religion,
conditioned by highly publicized frauds and other excesses by mail-
order [and now TV] "ministries" and "mind-control cults." Limited
government regulation can curb many of these abuses and thereby
yield an environment of public goodwill which actually enhances the
free play for religious beliefs.
Esbeck, supra note 29, at 378 n.18.
57. One prominent federal judge has written: "Each year, with renewed
vigor, many citizens seek sanctuary in the free exercise clause of the first
amendment. They desire salvation not from sin or from temptation,
however, but from the most earthly of mortal duties-income taxes." Mone
v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 570, 571 (2d Cir. 1985) (Kaufman, J., opinion of
the court). In a similar vein, Thomas Robbins writes: "It seems unlikely that
certain movements such as Synanon or Scientology would have defined
themselves as churches or even as 'religious' movements were it not for the
legal protections the Constitution affords such groups." Robbins, supra note
54, at 8. See also Beebe, Tax Problems Posed by Pseudo-Religious Movements, 446
ANNALS, AAPSS 91 (1975); Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 43, at 314.
58. Lupu, supra note 4, at 766.
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indeed.59 This explains why the problem of "cheating,"
although it exists whenever any kind of exemption is created, is
especially widespread and difficult to deal with in the case of
religion-based exemptions. Courts hesitate to question the
sincerity and truth of claims made by self-proclaimed religious
groups for fear that in doing so they will violate those groups'
religious freedom.6"
The next three arguments apply especially, although not
exclusively, to exemptions as rights, because these arguments
are, in effect, accounts of the problems inherent in the process
by which courts grant exemptions as rights. Thus the fourth
objection to religion-based exemptions is that there is no clear,
workable, or fair way of limiting the number and kinds of
exemptions to be granted if persons had a recognized constitu-
tional right to disobey for religious reasons whatever laws they
chose to disobey-and if there were no limits imposed on such
exemptions, the political consequences could be severe.6' Per-
haps it would be a bit much to say that anarchy would reign; the
Supreme Court would never allow matters to go anywhere near
that far. The question, however, is whether the Court can draw
the line in any sort of fair and principled manner. Although
the Court theoretically could come up with some principled
way of determining which claims for exemptions it would
accept and which it would not, it is precisely "a principled way
to delimit the notion of a religious practice [that] is lacking." 62
59. Determinations of sincerity are inherently uncertain; ....
Governmental determinations of religious sincerity thus threaten to
result in the very abuses that the religion clauses were, at least in
part, designed to prevent. Being subjected by one's government to
a false charge of lying about one's religious beliefs is itself a serious
wrong.
Pepper, supra note 39, at 326.
60. Fingarette, Coercion, Coercive Persuasion, and the Law, in CULTS,
CULTURE, AND THE LAW, supra note 54, at 90. One of the reasons for this
hesitation is the fact that the Supreme Court has held that the first
amendment prohibits courts, in trials for fraud, from considering the truth or
falsity of "religious" claims made by defendants. See United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78 (1944).
61. As the Court wrote in Reynolds:
Can a man excuse his [disobedience to law] because of his religious
belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government
could exist only in name under such circumstances.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878). See also McConnell,
supra note 43, at 30.
62. Evans, supra note 35, at 479, 467-79.
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Consequently, the courts in deciding who is eligible for exemp-
tions will inevitably make decisions that are arbitrary, unpre-
dictable, and discriminatory.63
There are three reasons that make this inevitable. The first
pertains to the definition of "religion." On the one hand, the
Supreme Court's functional definition of "religion" allows
almost any activity to count as religious and thus be immune
from government regulation and taxation. Paradoxically, that
fact has caused the Court to be skittish about granting exemp-
tions as rights.64 (The Court, however, is not likely to narrow
its definition, because it is so widely held that "there is no prin-
cipled way to circumscribe the concept of a religious belief
without threatening the freedom of conscience.") 65 On the
other hand, trial judges operating under this expansive defini-
tion must decide whether particular persons, organizations, or
activities are presumptively covered by the protection afforded
by the religion clauses. Given the absence of a clear and lim-
ited definition of "religion" from the Supreme Court, they will
inevitably pick and choose arbitrarily from among those claim-
ing to be religious. In particular, it has been argued that
judges are more likely to classify as religions those institutions
and activities with which they are familiar or which they appre-
ciate. Mainstream religions, in other words, are more likely to
gain exemptions than new, marginal ones.66
A second but related reason for the inability of courts to
determine consistently and fairly who or what is eligible for an
exemption is the fact that even if "religion" were narrowly
defined the range of activities that genuinely religious persons
or groups might consider to be religiously significant is still vir-
tually unlimited. There is almost no activity taxed or regulated
by the government for which some person or group some-
where might not want an exemption because that activity is sin-
cerely considered to be religious in nature. Courts, however,
cannot exempt all such activities from the hand of government.
But if they cannot, on what basis can distinctions be made?6 7
63. This is an especially important argument because even the
advocates of religion-based exemptions agree that they must not be given
unless they can be applied consistently and fairly. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note
42, at 342.
64. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
65. Evans, supra note 35, at 472. On this point, see Note, supra note 34,
at 1072-75. (This belief, however, is not shared by this writer.)
66. See R. MORGAN, supra note 11, at 149-52, 208; Lupu, supra note 4, at
765-66; Note, supra note 34, at 1072-75. For an argument against this view,
see infra note 76.
67. See Evans, supra note 35, at 474-79; Garvey, Free Exercise and the
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The third reason for the complex of problems mentioned
above is the nature of the balancing test used by courts in free
exercise cases. 68 In particular cases, courts will take into
account a number of factors relating to the interests of both
religion and government, without weighting them in any sort of
meaningful or comparable way. As Tushnet notes: "The 'rele-
vant considerations' are defined so generally that the weight a
decision maker gives to any particular consideration is left
almost entirely open. The effect is that balancing tests are
inevitably driven by the results sought to be reached."69 Even
advocates of a right to religion-based exemptions admit that
the determination of who is eligible for such exemptions can be
"troubling" and may "result in arbitrary decisions."" It is no
wonder, then, that the Supreme Court's free exercise decisions
have been widely condemned for being inconsistent, 7' confus-
ing, 72 unpredictable, 73 and providing insufficient guidance to
lower courts. 4
The arbitrariness inherent in the use of a balancing test
means that free exercise decisions by courts will inevitably dis-
criminate against some religions and in favor of others. Part of
Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779, 783 (1986). On this point,
Justice O'Connor has written:
A broad range of government activities-from social welfare
programs to foreign aid to conservation projects-will always be
considered essential to the spiritual well-being of some citizens,
often on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs. Others will find
the very same activities deeply offensive, and perhaps incompatible
with their own search for spiritual fulfillment and with the tenets of
their religion .... [But] government simply could not operate if it
were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1327
(1988).
68. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text for a description of
the balancing test.
69. Tushnet, supra note 22, at 631.
70. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L. REV.
146, 157 (1986). Pepper also admits that "a balancing test is inherently
imprecise and subject to manipulation and distortion ...... Pepper, supra
note 39, at 310.
71. Goldwin & Kaufman, Preface, in How DOES THE CONSTITUTION
PROTECT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM? xiv (R.A. Goldwin & A. Kaufman eds. 1987);
Marshall, Introduction, 18 CONN. L. REV. 697, 698 (1986).
72. See, e.g., Pepper, Conundrum, supra note 13, at 303; Tushnet, supra
note 22, at 628-29.
73. See Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv. 327,
329-30 (1969); Lupu, supra note 4, at 767-68; Note, supra note 5, at 351-62.
74. Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 43, at 303; Comment, Zoning
Ordinances Affecting Churches: A Proposal for Expanded Free Exercise Protection, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1131, 1148 (1984).
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the problem stems from the fact that judges must determine
whether a certain action or activity is required by church doc-
trine or is otherwise religiously significant. In making such
determinations, judges all too often will be either confused or
will rely on their own understanding of what is religiously sig-
nificant.75 The problem of discrimination, however, is not due
simply to uninformed or biased judges, but to the nature of the
decision-making process itself. The courts cannot grant all
requests for exemptions; lines must be drawn. However,
because the line-drawing is done on a case by case basis and
depends on the application of a balancing test that takes
account of a number of incommensurable factors, it is inevita-
ble that in some cases a certain religious activity will be
exempted, while in other cases another activity that is similar to
but not identical with the first activity will not be exempted. 76
The Supreme Court itself has expressed concern about the
problem of religious discrimination or unfairness that arises
from the use of a balancing test. 77 For example, it was partly
for this reason, i.e., to serve the government's "interest in uni-
form treatment for the members of all religious faiths," that the
Court refused to grant an exemption from the military's dress
code in the case of Goldman v. Weinberger. 71 It decided that it
would be better "to make no accommodation at all rather than
to accommodate the practices of some religions but not
75. As Laycock has noted: "[T]he distinctions required by this
approach are difficult, especially for secular courts unversed in theological
subtleties, and an error can result in penalizing a church for an act of
conscience." Laycock, supra note 3, at 1400.
76. Contrary to what might be expected, the discrimination may not
occur completely at random, for one study of free exercise adjudication in
state and federal courts found that the courts' use of the balancing test had
benefited marginal religions more than it had benefited established religions.
Way & Burt, Religious Marginality and the Free Exercise Clause, 77 AM. POL.
SCIENCE REV. 652 (1983). This finding is consistent with Mark Tushnet's
reading of the courts' handling of free exercise cases, that only the more
trivial activities and the smaller religions have a chance of getting exemptions
(marginality principle). Tushnet, supra note 22, at 638-39. Philip Kurland has
also noticed that the smaller the religion the greater its chances of getting an
exemption. Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213, 243 (1973).
77. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455-58 (1971).
78. 475 U.S. 503, 512 (1986). The Court's reasoning is explained by
McConnell: "Although accommodation might be made for skull-caps without
serious detriment to the appearance of uniformity, the demands of other
religions, such as turbans for Sikhs or dreadlocks for Rastafarian, would not
be so easily accommodated." McConnell, supra note 70, at 154.
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others." 79 In fact, the Court has recently admitted that it is
simply not in a position to determine the centrality of a reli-
gious practice or to weigh the adverse effects on religion in one
case and compare them with the adverse effects in another.8 °
It can be argued, of course, that this complex of problems
could be eliminated if the Supreme Court were actually to use a
"compelling state interest" test rather than a balancing test,
i.e., if it were to insist that the religious interest should always
prevail except when the state interest is truly "compelling. 81
Such an argument, however, is weak, for two reasons. First, it
would allow the most trivial religious interests to "trump" very
important (but not "compelling") government interests. Sec-
ond, a "compelling interest" test is still a balancing test, albeit
one in which the religious interests theoretically "weigh" more
heavily in the "scales" than do the government interests. In
other words, the test is still vague enough that courts can
manipulate it to justify almost any decision they make regard-
less of the significance of the competing interests, 82 as is illus-
trated by the fact that in some of the very cases in which it
decided against exemptions, the Court insisted that it was using
a "compelling interest" test even though, according to most
observers, the state interests involved were clearly less than
compelling.8 3 Moreover, the same problem would exist were
the courts to use the establishment clause's rule against "exces-
sive entanglement" between religion and government as a way
of protecting the autonomy of churches. 84
79. McConnell, supra note 70, at 154.
80. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct.
1319, 1325 (1988).
81. For examples of this argument, see Pepper, supra note 39, at 299-
336; Teitel, supra note 24, at 651-88.
82. Note, supra note 5, at 351-62.
83. West, supra note 20, at 417-21; Pepper, Conundrum, supra note 13, at
267-68; Freed and Polsby, supra note 24, at 20-21, 29-30. Thus, in his
concurring opinion in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), Justice
Stevens chided his colleagues for claiming to use a compelling interest test
when, in his opinion, there clearly was no compelling reason for not
exempting Amish employers from the social security tax. The standard
actually being applied, he observed, was one "that places an almost
insurmountable burden on any individual who [for religious reasons] objects
to a valid and neutral law of general applicability.. " Id. at 263 n.3 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
84. Concerning the rule against "excessive entanglement," Douglas
Laycock writes:
"Entanglement" is such a "blurred, indistinct, and variable" term
that it is useless as an analytic tool. Sometimes it seems to mean
contact, or the opposite of separation; it has also been used
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A fifth objection to religion-based exemptions, or at least
to exemptions as constitutional rights, is that in making deci-
sions about claimed exemptions, courts are very likely to
become entangled with religion in the worst sort of way,
namely by making judgments on doctrinal or theological issues.
On the impropriety of doctrinal entanglement, the Supreme
Court has been clear and consistent: government must not take
a position on essentially religious issues.85 Courts, however, in
deciding exemption cases, cannot avoid doing just that. In
order to determine whether the religious interests at issue out-
weigh the governmental interests, they must decide how relig-
iously significant the threatened activity is. 86 This requires
judges to make decisions they are not qualified to make and
which frequently will be contested as unfair by the religious
claimants in the case. 87 One advocate of a right to religion-
based exemptions, Michael McConnell, concedes the point: "If
the government grants religious exemptions from its laws it
inevitably will be forced to draw lines that require judgments
about religious beliefs. The long-term effect of repeated judg-
ments by government officials about the nature and weight of
religious beliefs might well be to interfere with the autonomy
of religious life."
88
The only way for the courts to avoid making such inquiries
would be to accept all claims for exemptions simply on the say
of the claimants that the activity in question is genuinely reli-
gious-a move that would, of course, encourage the most wide-
spread and questionable use of exemptions, and for that
interchangeably with "involvement" and "relationship." Sometimes
it seems to mean anything that might violate the religion clauses.
Laycock, supra note 3, at 1392 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
614 (1971)). See also Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten
Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1195, 1218, 1225 (1980); Esbeck, supra
note 29, at 383.
85. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (in settling church
disputes, courts must not take a position on the meaning and importance of
religious doctrines and practices); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457
(1971) (government should avoid entangling itself in difficult classifications
of what is and is not religious); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)
(courts may not judge the comprehensibility or validity of asserted religious
beliefs); L. TRIBE, supra note 44, at 1231-42; Esbeck, supra note 29, at 389-97.
86. Garvey, supra note 67, at 785-86.
87. Ripple, supra note 84, at 1218; Laycock, supra note 3, at 1400.
88. McConnell, supra note 70, at 154. McConnell goes on to say:
"There is but a fine line between government determinations on religiously
relevant legal issues and government pronouncements on religious questions
themselves." Id. at 155.
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reason, would never be allowed by the Supreme Court.89 To
avoid the dilemma of having to choose between such an out-
come and courts' becoming doctrinally entangled in religious
issues is one of the reasons why Justices Rehnquist and Ste-
vens, and perhaps Justice White, now oppose the granting of
any religion-based exemptions as rights, and favor instead a
neutral approach that does not require judges to distinguish
between religious believers and unbelievers or among religious
beliefs.9 ° It is also one of the main reasons why a majority of
the Court's justices now say they do not want to become
involved in assessing the centrality of religious practices in
order to decide if they deserve constitutional protection.9 '
Even Justice Brennan, the author of the Court's Sherbert
opinion, now argues that if legislatures are going to grant
exemptions to churches, they should do so in a neutral, indirect
fashion, that is, by granting the exemptions to nonprofit orga-
nizations generally, and not just to churches.92 Although he
continues to believe that at times the free exercise clause
requires religion-based exemptions to be granted by courts,
consistency requires that he take the same position on court-
ordered exemptions that he takes on legislature-granted
exemptions, i.e., that such determinations should be neutral,
not religion-based. Indeed, a strong argument can be made
89. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1327 (1988).
90. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 716 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 733 (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 262-63 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707, 720-23 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91. Speaking for the Court in Lyng, Justice O'Connor said that a
judicial policy of weighing:
[T]he value of every religious belief and practice that is said to be
threatened by any government program . . . offers the prospect of
this Court holding that some sincerely held religious beliefs and
practices are not "central" to certain religions, despite protestations
to the contrary from the religious objectors who brought the lawsuit.
In other words, [it] ... would require us to rule that some religious
adherents misunderstand their own religious beliefs. We think such
an approach cannot be squared with the Constitution or with our
precedents, and that it would cast the judiciary in a role that we were
never intended to play.
108 S. Ct. at 1329-30.
92. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 332 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Brennan forcefully reaffirmed this
position in the plurality opinion that he wrote for the Court in Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890, 892-905 (1989).
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that if religion-based exemptions are going to be granted at all,
they should be granted by legislatures, not courts.93
The final argument against recognizing a right to be
exempt from obedience to valid laws on religious grounds is
that the existence of such a right makes it almost impossible for
the Supreme Court to develop a coherent, persuasive body of
church-state law based on the religion clauses of the first
amendment. The evidence to support this assertion consists,
first, of the fact that current church-state law is in shambles.
The Court's decisions in this area have been so weak in terms
of clarity, consistency, and cogency that there is scarcely a con-
stitutional law scholar alive who has not excoriated the Court
for creating a legal mess.94 Second, there is widespread agree-
ment that the root of the problem is that the Court has inter-
preted the free exercise and establishment clauses in such a
way that these clauses necessarily conflict with one another.95
More specifically, what the Court has done is to interpret both
93. Richard Morgan explains:
The legislature can create exemptions with at least some selectivity;
it can fall back on reasons of practicality and expediency which
would create scandal coming from a constitutional Court. The
legislature, in short, is not as vulnerable to the arguments by
analogy and the demands of doctrinal symmetry as theJustices. It is
precisely the striving toward doctrinal coherence-the distinctive,
legitimatizing characteristic of the American Supreme Court-which
renders it unwise to attempt to handle conscientious. objection
constitutionally. Either the exemptions will be extended into areas
where they are politically unacceptable, or they will not be so
extended and the Court will not be able to explain why. Legislatures
do not labor under the same obligation to explain, and they have a
great deal more room for policy maneuvering before running into
constitutional restraints.
R. MORGAN, supra note 11, at 209-10.
94. A typical comment is the following:
The Court has rigidly adhered to tests developed under the free
exercise and establishment clauses despite well-aimed criticism that
both tests are confusing and nonsensical .... Indeed, the one salient
point upon which academia has reached almost universal agreement
is that the policies and principles underlying religion clause
jurisprudence have been inadequately explored and inconsistently
applied by the judiciary. Too many fundamental tenets of
constitutional law have been only summarily announced.
Marshall, supra note 71, at 698. See also Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in
First Amendment Religion Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REv. 817, 839 (1984); Laycock,
supra note 3, at 1373; Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 43, at 303; McConnell,
supra note 43, at 5-6 n.13; Tushnet, supra note 22, at 628-29.
95. See Choper, supra note 43, at 673-701; Teitel, supra note 24, at 681-
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clauses too broadly.9 6 The free exercise clause, according to
the Court, requires exemptions from laws that burden the prac-
tice of religion, while the establishment clause prohibits laws
that significantly aid religion or excessively entangle govern-
ment with religion. Just how these two interpretations can be
reconciled, however, the Court has utterly failed to demon-
strate.9 7 Thus, the only solution to the confusion that now per-
vades church-state law is for the Court to interpret both clauses
more narrowly so that they will complement, not contradict,
one another. This, in turn, requires that the Court abandon
the doctrine that the free exercise clause gives persons or
groups a right to religion-based exemptions.
In summary, the arguments against recognizing a constitu-
tional right to religion-based exemptions are that such a judi-
cial policy violates the principle of neutrality toward religion;
divides the American people against one another; encourages
false claims; is difficult, if not impossible, for courts to adminis-
ter without being arbitrary, discriminatory, or becoming entan-
gled in doctrinal or religious issues; and makes impossible the
development of a convincing body of church-state law. More-
over, one cannot say, as McConnell does, 98 that these argu-
ments apply much less to exemptions granted to religious
organizations than they do to exemptions granted to individu-
als. One has only to look at the controversy that has sur-
rounded the Internal Revenue Service's administration of tax
exemptions for churches to know that court-ordered exemp-
tions for churches would cause as many problems as would
exemptions for individuals.99 The only way that churches or
individuals could receive exemptions without such problems
would be by having a judicial policy of automatically granting
96. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
97. See Evans, supra note 35, at 463-91; Garvey, supra note 42, at 198;
Paulsen, supra note 42, at 314.
98. McConnell, supra note 70, at 159.
99. See Emory & Zelenak, The Tax Exempt Status of Communitarian Religious
Organizations: An Unnecessary Controversy?, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (1982);
Petkanics & S. Petkanics, Mail Order Ministries, The Religious Purpose Exemption,
and The Constitution, 33 TAX LAWYER 959 (1980); Schwarz, Limiting Religious Tax
Exemptions: When Should the Church Render Unto Caesar?, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 50
(1976); Slye, Rendering Unto Caesar. Defining 'Religion 'for Purpose of Administering
Religion-Based Tax Exemptions, 6 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 219 (1983); Whelan,
"Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems, 45 FORDHAM L.
REV. 885 (1977); Worthing, The Internal Revenue Service as Monitor of Church
Institutions: The Excessive Entanglement Problem, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 929 (1977).
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exemptions to whoever claimed eligibility for them-a policy so
extreme that surely no one would defend it.
Although all .these arguments are forceful, by themselves
they do not necessarily imply that the Supreme Court should
declare that religious individuals and organizations have no
constitutional right to be exempt from certain regulations and
taxes imposed upon them by the government. There are, after
all, arguments to be made on behalf of religious exemptions.
What the preceding analysis clearly does, however, is to make
the case against such a right so strong that only the most com-
pelling of reasons would justify the continued recognition of
such a right.
III. THE ARGUMENTS FOR A RIGHT TO RELIGION-BASED
EXEMPTIONS
The previous section raised the question: Should religious
persons or organizations have a constitutional right to be
excused from having to obey laws that all other citizens are
required to obey? This section evaluates the principal argu-
ments that have been or could be given to support such a right.
Its aim is to show that none of the arguments are satisfactory.
In attempting to show this, however, it does not analyze each of
these arguments in detail, because many of them are defective
in basic ways that become apparent upon casual examination:
the arguments are either too broad (i.e. they justify giving
exemptions to a category of recipients that includes more than
religious persons and groups) or too narrow (i.e. the proposed
category fails to include all religious persons and groups), and
some are both.
First, it might be said that exemptions are needed to pro-
tect human autonomy or freedom. But all persons and groups
may claim that they have as much a right to freedom as do reli-
gious persons and groups.' 00 A second, similar argument is
that the denial of exemptions to certain religious persons or
groups amounts to minority oppression of the sort that the Bill
of Rights was intended to prevent. 0 ' If, however, a minority is
"oppressed" whenever a religious person or group is denied an
exemption, this is true only in the sense that "oppression"
occurs any time a law requires any person or group to do or not
do something to which he/she/it objects. Surely it cannot be
said that the Bill of Rights was intended to do away with all
100. Garvey, supra note 67, at 789-91.
101. For such an argument, see Pepper, Some Thoughts on Perspective, 4
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 649 (1990).
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minority oppression in this sense, for it is not a prescription for
anarchy." °2 If, however, all "oppressed minorities" do not
have a right to be excused from obeying laws to which object,
then the question remains why religious objectors, and they
alone, should have such a right. 10 3
The third and fourth arguments justify exemptions only
for churches and other religious organizations. The third
claims that because churches are voluntary organizations
whose members freely consent to whatever their churches are
doing, any government action to protect those members is
unwarranted paternalism. 0 4 Aside from the arguments, first,
that it is difficult to distinguish between insiders (members) and
outsiders (nonmembers) and, second, that church members do
not all agree on church policy, there is the more basic response
that many private, voluntary organizations other than churches
can also claim that they enjoy the "consent" of their members
and thus that government regulation of their internal affairs
constitutes unwarranted paternalism. A fourth justification for
religious exemptions is that churches contribute to the public
goodl 05-but then, of course, so do many other organizations.
On the other hand, many so-called churches or religions do
not, in fact, contribute to the public good, at least not as most
people understand the public good.'0 6
Fifth, it has been argued that religious persons experience
a special kind of emotional harm or suffering when they obey
laws that their religion commands them not to obey.10 7 This
argument, however, cuts too narrowly because there are many
102. This is not to deny that the Bill of Rights protects minorities. It
does so, however, by guaranteeing certain specific rights, not by freeing
objectors generally from their obligation of obedience to laws. The crucial
issue, therefore, is what those rights guaranteed by the Constitution are and,
in particular, whether they include a right to religion-based exemptions. This
question is addressed below in section IV.
103. Moreover, Pepper's admonition to take the perspective of the
oppressed, supra note 101, at 650, adds nothing to the argument, for it
assumes that it is only lack of sensitivity to the plight of religious objectors
that accounts for opposition to religion-based exemptions as rights.
Although that may indeed be true in some cases, to assume that it is generally
true or to argue that it is actually the case for any given opponent of
exemptions simply because the person is a Protestant is to engage in the
worst sort of ad hominem argumentation.
104. See Laycock, supra note 3, at 1403-06, 1408-09.
105. McConnell, supra note 43, at 16-19.
106. See Braiterman & Kelley, When Is Governmental Intervention
Legitimate?, in GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 171-72
(D.M. Kelley ed. 1982).
107. Garvey, supra note 67, at 792-93.
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truly religious activities whose abandonment, though seen as
undesirable, would not cause "pangs of conscience."'10 Also,
it would protect only individuals and not churches, because
churches (institutions) do not have emotions, and their mem-
bers do not share the same beliefs or emotions. 10 9 On the
other hand, as Kent Greenawalt has argued, there are secular
conscientious objectors who in the same circumstances also
experience the same kind and degree of suffering as that exper-
ienced by religious objectors. 110 If, in order to counter this
objection, one suggests, as Jesse Choper has done, that exemp-
tions be given only to persons whose reason for not wanting to
obey a law is to avoid punishment in the afterlife,111 then the
criterion for exemption becomes too narrow because there are
many religious persons whose behavior is not influenced by a
belief in the afterlife or by concern for punishments of any
sort.11
2
A sixth argument is that exemptions should be given to
religious persons and groups so that the peace and order of
society will not be threatened by widespread disobedience, civil
or otherwise, by religious objectors."' Although peace and
order are very valuable, there is no reason to think that reli-
gious persons or groups would be more likely to disobey laws
or to engage in acts of violence than would other persons and
groups upset with the government and its laws." 14
Seventh and finally, there is John Garvey's argument that
religious persons should be exempt from obeying laws to which
they object because they are similar to insane persons in that
they lack the powers of cognition and volition, at least with
respect to certain decisions. 1 5 If this argument is meant to be
108. Id. at 793-94; Laycock, supra note 3, at 1390-91; McConnell, supra
note 43, at 27.
109. See Lupu, supra note 4, at 766.
110. K. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 321-26 (1987).
See also Garvey, supra note 67, at 793-94.
111. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L.
REV. 579, 598.
112. K. GREENAWALT, supra note 110, at 324-25; Garvey, supra note 67,
at 793-94.
113. Garvey, supra note 67, at 794-95, and McConnell, supra note 43, at
16.
114. Garvey, supra note 67, at 796. Garvey gives another reason for
rejecting the civil disobedience argument. This is that it "provides too little
protection because it builds on policy (social utility) rather than principle. If
conflicting social goals loomed larger than [order]. . ., the right would go up
in smoke." Id. (citing with approval R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
90-100, 266-72 (1977)).
115. Id. at 798-801. For a similar argument to the effect that persons
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taken seriously, the obvious answer to it is, on the one hand,
that something like an insanity defense should be broadly avail-
able to all persons, not just religious ones, and, on the other
hand, that churches and indeed many if not most religious per-
sons simply do not fit the insanity model. 1 6
Are there any arguments for a right to religion-based
exemptions that are neither too broad nor too narrow? Four
have been made, three of which rely on some principle of neu-
trality. According to the first, the religious enterprise deserves
special privileges because "it is specially burdened by disquali-
fication from general state aid."' 17 As the law now stands, this
disqualification contention is essentially correct. The Supreme
Court has indeed interpreted the religion clauses as prohibiting
laws the primary effect of which is the financing of religion.
The principle of fairness, moreover, dictates that religion get
something in return. It does not necessarily dictate, however,
that that something be a right to exemptions granted to reli-
gious persons or groups. What it does dictate is the absence of
laws whose primary purpose or effect is to harm religion. The
Supreme Court has explained the fair deal required by the
principle of neutrality in these terms:
Our constitutional policy ... does not deny the value or
the necessity for religious training, teaching, or obser-
vance. Rather it secures their free exercise. But to that
end it does deny that the state can undertake or sustain
them in any form or degree. For this reason the sphere
of religious activity, as distinguished from the secular
intellectual liberties, has been given the two fold protection
and, as the state cannot forbid, neither can it perform or aid in
performing the religious function. The dual prohibition makes
that function altogether private." 8
It should be noted, however, that sometimes the Supreme
Court has disallowed financial aid not only to church activities
that are primarily religious in nature, but also to those that are
not primarily religious in nature, such as education in subjects
do not freely choose their religious and sexual orientations, see Replogle, Sex,
God, and Liberalism, 50 J. POLITICS 937 (1988).
116. Garvey's own reservations about this argument are stated in his
article, supra note 67, at 800.
117. Esbeck, supra note 29, at 379.
118. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 218-19 (1963).
For comments on the special protection afforded religion that is not afforded
secular ideas or doctrines, see Garvey, supra note 42, at 217-18; McConnell,
supra note 70, at 152.
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other than religion." 9 Insofar as the Court continues to bar
such indirect and secondary aid to religion, advocates of a right
to religion-based exemptions have a right to complain that the
principle of neutrality is not being lived up to by the govern-
ment. True neutrality, in short, calls for the Court to allow sec-
ondary, indirect aid to religion while at the same time
disallowing religion-based exemptions as a constitutional
right. 120
According to the second argument based on neutrality or
fairness, majority religions do not really need a right to reli-
gion-based exemptions because by virtue of their size and
political influence they are usually able to prevent the govern-
ment from passing laws that place, even inadvertently, any
prohibitions or burdens on the practice of their faith. 12 1
Minority religions, on the other hand, especially the smaller
ones, are not able to protect themselves through the normal
democratic political process. A right to exemptions is needed,
therefore, to protect minority religions and ensure government
neutrality toward all religions. '22
The main problem with this argument is that its empirical
assumptions about the nature of religion and government in
America are incorrect, in several respects. There are now no
majority religions in America, unless one is willing to ignore all
the many different varieties of Christianity that exist in this
country.' 23 Therefore, even though some religious groups are
bigger than others, it does not follow that they will often be
able to protect themselves from certain laws. 124 They will cer-
tainly find it difficult to do so if the Supreme Court continues to
119. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S.
472 (1973).
120. Hopefully this makes it clear that this article is not intended to be
an argument for the strict or absolute separation of church and state or for
the principle of no aid to religion.
121. Stephen Pepper rhetorically asks, "If Catholic or Jewish beliefs
prohibited photos on drivers' licenses, would they be required?" Pepper,
supra note 39, at 313.
122. See Galanter, supra note 17, at 217, 291; McConnell, supra note 70,
at 152-53; Pepper, supra note 39, at 313-14.
123. This is not to say that so-called "Christian" churches or sects have
nothing in common, but only that they have many differences, both religious
and political, and that some of them may have more in common with some
non-Christian groups than with some Christian groups. See Pulley, supra note
53, at 148.
124. Just as women, a numerical majority, have often been oppressed
by a male minority.
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hold, as it did recently in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,' 25 that
religion-based exemptions granted by legislatures violate the
establishment clause. Second, the political power or influence
of an interest group is not determined simply or even primarily
by size; money, cohesiveness, organization, and leadership may
be more important than size. As a consequence, relatively
small groups are often very successful in the political arena. 126
Finally, our government is not one of numerical majority rule;
rather, it is structured in such a way as to give minority groups
a degree of power that is far greater than their numbers alone
would suggest. Because of all the "checks" built into our sys-
tem, it is difficult for any majority to get its way; and to the
extent that it does, it does so by taking into account the inter-
ests of minorities.127
These three facts, of course, do not mean that no religious
group ever suffers from valid secular laws or that we do not
need a Bill of Rights to prevent the government from passing
certain kinds of laws, e.g. ones whose primary purpose or effect
is to discriminate against certain religions or certain persons
because of their religion. Rather, the point -is that one cannot
say how much, if any, the size of our different religious groups
is a factor in determining their success at obtaining legislature-
granted exemptions. In other words, it is simply not clear that
minority religions get fewer exemptions from legislatures than
do majority religions and thus have a special need for a right to
court-ordered exemptions. 28
125. 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989). As Jesse Choper has pointed out, the
argument that court-ordered exemptions are needed to equalize minority
and majority religions assumes that legislature-granted religion-based
exemptions are legitimate. If they are not, however, as the Court seems to
say in Texas Monthly, then two wrongs do not make a right. Choper, supra note
43, at 693.
126. See E. LADD, THE AMERICAN POLITY 411-18 (1987).
127. For elaboration and documentation of this point, see K.
SCHLOZMAN &J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(1986). It must be admitted, however, that this point applies more to the
national government than it does to state governments, and even less to local
governments. However, the fact that government in America is divided
among different levels itself makes it possible to a significant degree for
minorities, religious or otherwise, to find protection at some level of
government or in some part of the country-certainly more protection than
they could obtain in a unitary, majority-rule system.
128. Thus, the Quakers were able to obtain religious conscientious-
objector exemptions in various draft laws; the Christian Scientists have
obtained exemptions in state laws governing the practice of medicine; the
Amish obtained for themselves alone an exemption from the Social Security
tax on self-employed persons; and Congress enacted the American Indian
A RIGHT TO RELIGION-BASED EXEMPTIONS
The third argument for a right to religion-based exemp-
tions that involves the principle of neutrality is essentially an
attempt to refute the argument made earlier that the availabil-
ity of such a right violates that principle. It attempts to do this
by defining the government neutrality that is required by the
religion clauses in a way that differs from the characterization
used earlier.' 2 9 According to this alternative characterization,
government neutrality is required only with respect to a per-
son's choice of religion. Because this is so, the argument goes,
exemptions and other forms of accommodations of religion are
permissible provided they do not have the effect of forcing or
influencing persons to accept one religion over another, or any
religion at all. The argument assumes that the central value of
the religion clauses is freedom of choice with respect to reli-
gion and that those clauses prohibit only laws threatening that
freedom. If courts were to operate with such an understanding
of the neutrality toward religion that is required by the Consti-
tution, some exemptions would be acceptable and some would
not-the difference depending on their impact on the free
exercise (choice) of religion. 3 °
This way of understanding the religion clauses (together
with the principle of neutrality) is appealing, mainly because its
assumption that those clauses were intended to protect free-
dom of religious choice is correct. There are, however, two
serious flaws in the argument. First, its analysis of the purpose
of the religion clauses is incomplete, for it overlooks the fact
that the early proponents of religious liberty wanted to protect
not only free choice regarding religion, but also the quality or
integrity of both religion and government.'13  It is possible,
Religious Freedom Act of 1978. Way & Burt, supra note 76, at 653. Although
Way and Burt go on to say that legislative exemptions appear to be less
common than court-ordered exemptions, they give no evidence to support
this claim.
129. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
130. Perhaps the best statement of this argument has been made by
Paulsen, supra note 42, but similar arguments have been made by Schwartz,
No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968);
Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion
under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805, 829 (1978); Choper, supra
note 43.
131. See Little, Roger Williams and the Separation of Church and State, in
RELIGION AND THE STATE: EssAYs IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 13-16 (J. Wood,
Jr. ed. 1985). Although Roger Williams was certainly opposed to laws that
coerced persons with respect to religion, the most fundamental principle in
his theory of church-state relations was that government should not legislate
on matters of religion-not only because such laws, he thought, entailed
some degree of coercion or at least influence, but because legislation with
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therefore, that they would have opposed some laws that had no
negative effect on religious choice. This, in turn, leads to the
second flaw in the argument, which is that it permits some
forms of government accommodation to which the founders
clearly objected. For example, under the principle of neutrality
being considered here, not all establishments of religion would
necessarily violate the religion clauses, because it is possible to
have an established religion that is thoroughly liberal and toler-
ant. 32 We know, however, that the framers of the first amend-
ment opposed the establishment of a national religion of any
sort 3 3 -a fact inconsistent with the argument that they
opposed only laws that actually and negatively affect the free
choice of religion. The explanation for the apparent inconsis-
tency is that the framers presumed that all statutes classifying
along religious lines had pernicious effects upon the exercise of
religious liberty. '34
It must be admitted, however, that early Americans did not
always adhere to a policy of enacting no laws explicitly or
essentially religious in purpose or effect, for they passed laws
that symbolically linked religion and government and that gave
exemptions from tax laws to churches and exemptions from
military service to conscientious objectors. 135 Where does this
leave us? The only honest conclusion to be drawn is that the
founders were divided over how to protect religious freedom.
Today, therefore, we have a choice between two ways of pro-
respect to religion was the prerogative of God alone. See West, Roger Williams
on the Limits of Religious Liberty, in THE ANNUAL OF THE SOCIETY OF CHRISTIAN
ETHICS 137-38, 153 (D.M. Yeager ed. 1988).
132. "Statutes classifying along religious lines often may have virtually
no discernible effect on the actual exercise or nonexercise of religion.
Surprisingly enough, this might even be said of an officially established, but
completely liberal and tolerant, national religion." Paulsen, supra note 42, at
341 n. 130. The same can probably be said about tax support of churches and
other forms of private religious activity. See id. at 337; Choper, supra note 43,
at 678, 695.
133. See Reichley, Religion and the Constitution, in RELIGION IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 4 (C.W. Dunn ed. 1989).
134. Paulsen candidly admits this fact: "Presumptively, at least,
classifications along religious lines have effects upon the exercise of religious
liberty. This appears to have been the fundamental premise behind the
establishment clause insofar as it was designed to protect religious liberty.
An official church, for example, is conclusively presumed to impair an
individual's freedom to worship as he or she chooses." Paulsen, supra note
42, at 341. In agreement is Lupu, supra note 4, at 741-42.
135. R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 188-92 (1982); M.
HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 160 (1965); Reichley, supra note
133, at 9-10.
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tecting religious freedom and thus two ways of understanding
the principle of government neutrality toward religion. The
moderate approach would not prohibit all laws that are explic-
itly or essentially religious in nature, but it would require the
courts to judge these laws on a case by case basis according to
their effects on religious choice. The more extreme approach
would strike down all laws that are explicitly or essentially reli-
gious in nature, on the assumption that they pose "dangers to
social harmony, personal freedom, and religion itself."' 36
Of the two kinds of neutrality, which is preferable?
Although the founders did not make an unequivocal choice
between these two approaches, the evidence suggests that in
general they preferred the second and thus the kind of govern-
ment neutrality toward religion upon which the case against a
right to religion-based exemptions rests.' 37 Michael Paulsen
comes close to this view, for although he defends religion-
based exemptions, he says that they should be treated as "sus-
pect classifications," subjected to "strict scrutiny," and thus
allowed only when they can be shown not to abridge religious
liberty. 138 Moreover, the moderate understanding of neutrality
is vulnerable to the criticism that it raises too many questions
about just what is forbidden by the religion clauses. For exam-
ple, is it influence and inducement that is prohibited, or merely
pressure and coercion? And how can courts fairly and accu-
rately determine when and to what extent "coercion" is affect-
ing the religious decisions that persons make?' 3 9 For these
reasons, the case for a moderate understanding of government
neutrality toward religion is not convincing.
This brings us to the final and most common argument for
a Constitutional right to religion-based exemptions. This argu-
ment is not, however, either a theoretical or practical argument
but an appeal to a written authority, namely, the Constitution
itself. The religion clauses themselves are cited as proof of the
fact that the courts should give special protection to religion. 140
It is not enough, however, to say that the Constitution gives
136. Reichley, supra note 133, at 10.
137. See infra Section IV.
138. Paulsen, supra note 42, at 341-42, 345.
139. For discussions of the difficulty of determining the nature and
presence of coercion in the area of religion, see the several essays on this
issue in CULTS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW, supra note 54, at 59-160.
140. Religion has "special value" because only it "is explicitly
mentioned in the first amendment." Garvey, supra note 67, at 791. For
similar assertions, see McConnell, supra note 43, at 9; Pepper, supra note 39,
at 330.
1990]
622 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LA W, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 4
religion special protection. No one is contesting that point; it
is clear that the religion clauses prohibit laws whose primary
purpose or effect is the inhibition of religion. What is at issue,
rather, is how much protection the Constitution gives religion
and, more specifically, whether it guarantees a right on the part
of religious individuals and groups to religion-based exemp-
tions. The answer usually given is that of course it does. What
else could the free exercise clause mean to provide if not a
right to religion-based exemptions? After all, the word "exer-
cise" means to "practice,' ''apply," or "live out," and the word
"free" means without legal restraint. Therefore, the free exer-
cise clause is clearly violated, at least presumptively, by any law
that imposes any restraint on any conduct or behavior deemed
to be part of one's religion. Both Supreme Court justices'4 1
and legal scholars 142 assume this to be almost a self-evident
truth.
The fact of the matter, however, is that such an interpreta-
tion of the free exercise clause is simply false. It is a classic
example of how a literal or common sense reading of a consti-
tutional or legal text can be completely misleading, for the con-
temporary understanding of the phrase "free exercise of
religion" is not the understanding that was held by those eight-
eenth-century Americans who used the phrase and fought for
its inclusion in the constitutions of that age. This point is of
the utmost significance because the case made by the Supreme
Court and legal scholars for a constitutional right to religion-
based exemptions is based almost entirely on the unexamined
and unsupported assumption that the plain words of the first
amendment mandate such a right. If that assumption can be
141. For example:
The text of the Free Exercise Clause speaks of laws that prohibit the
free exercise of religion. On its face, the Clause is directed at
government interference with free exercise. Given that concern,
one can plausibly assert that government pursues free exercise
clause values when it lifts a government-imposed burden on the free
exercise of religion.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
142. For example:
The free exercise clause confers a substantive freedom, and not
merely a right to equal protection. For example, national
prohibition without an exception for sacramental uses of wine would
prohibit the free exercise of the Christian and Jewish religions, and
equal application of the law would not save it.
Laycock, supra note 3, at 1379 n.63. For similar comments, see Choper, supra
note 43, at 683, 686, 688; Garvey, supra note 42, at 219; McConnell, supra
note 70, at 152; Pepper, supra note 39, at 300-01, 330.
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shown to be unwarranted, which the next section attempts to
do, then the case for such a right fails.
IV. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
This section is a brief summary of an immense amount of
historical data and research relating to the original meaning of
the free exercise clause. Although there are many kinds of data
that one could look at in order to ascertain the original mean-
ing of the free exercise clause, the two most important, and the
ones relied on here, are (a) the understanding of religious free-
dom held by those persons who are generally recognized as
being at the forefront of the movement for religious liberty143
and (b) the general events of the eighteenth century relating to
church-state relations as recounted in the best, most recent his-
torical scholarship on the period.' 44 The historical data makes
it abundantly clear that the "free exercise of religion" men-
tioned in the first amendment was not originally understood to
include a right to violate legitimate laws with impunity. Rather,
"free exercise of religion" meant the absence of laws whose
primary purpose or effect was either to support or harm religion
in general, any particular religion, or any persons or groups
because of their religion, and it meant nothing more than that.
Simply put, the free exercise of religion meant the freedom to
choose and practice one's religion (or no religion) without
being subjected to intentional, direct government coercion or
influence. 14
5
143. According to Anson Phelps Stokes, the statesmen and religious
leaders most interested in religious freedom from 1775 to 1790 were
Benjamin Franklin,John Witherspoon, George Mason, Isaac Backus, George
Washington, Patrick Henry, Samuel Livermore, Thomas Paine, John Carroll,
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Charles Pinckney, and John Leland. A.P.
STOKES, 1 CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 292-357 (1950).
Because Franklin, Henry, Livermore, Paine, and Pinckney failed to write very
much on the meaning of religious liberty or, if they did, what they wrote has
not survived to this day, this article relies primarily on the ideas of
Witherspoon, Mason, Backus, Washington, Carroll, Jefferson, Madison, and
Leland. See West, The Founding Fathers and the Scope of Religious Liberty (paper
presented at annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Ass'n, Chicago,
Illinois, Apr. 10, 1987).
144. I have relied, in particular, on M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS:
THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978); L. LEVY,
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); T.
CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); W. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION
AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1986).
145. It must be emphasized that the argument set forth in this section is
not for an "originalist" interpretation of the Constitution, for it does not
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That the free exercise clause was understood in this way is
indicated, first of all, by the general understanding of the
nature of freedom that prevailed in the eighteenth century.
Freedom, to most persons who thought and wrote about it, did
not mean freedom to do as one pleases or freedom from law;
on the contrary, as John Locke argued, it meant freedom
through law.' 46 After all, the main function of government was
understood to be the protection of life, liberty, and prop-
erty. 147 In the absence of good laws, it was not clear to what
extent persons would be free; it depended on their circum-
stances and personal traits. The main threat to freedom, there-
fore, was not law per se, but arbitrary, unauthorized,
unconstitutional law.' 48 Because persons were free to do only
what was not lawfully prohibited, whenever early Americans
assume that the meaning of the Constitution should be determined
exclusively or even primarily by the original intent of the framers. Indeed,
the entire article is based on the opposite assumption that other kinds of
considerations, including significant changes in our government or society
from the eighteenth century to the present, may be taken into account by
judges responsible for interpreting the religion clauses of the Constitution.
This section discusses the original meaning of the free exercise clause only
because it has been shown that a right to religion-based exemptions cannot
be justified on the basis of nonhistorical kinds of reasons or factors and
because the defenders of a right to exemptions rely so heavily on what
amounts to an originalist position by claiming that the wording of the first
amendment creates such a right. Because an "originalist" argument is not
being made here, the contention made by Pepper, supra note 101, at 656-57,
that some of the founders might have favored a right to religion-based
exemptions if they had only known what life in contemporary America would
be like, is irrelevant. Even if it was relevant, moreover, given all the
arguments made earlier against such a right, there is no reason to believe that
the founders would have favored such a right if they could have foreseen
what contemporary America would be like.
146. [H]owever it may be mistaken, the end of law is not to abolish
or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom: for in all the states
of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law, there is no
freedom: for liberty is, to be free from restraint and violence from
others; which cannot be, where there is no law: but freedom is not as
we are told a liberty for every man to do what he lists: . . . but a
liberty to dispose, and order as he lists, . . . within the allowance of
those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the
arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.
J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 32 (C.B. Macpherson ed. 1980)
(1st ed. 1690).
147. See, e.g., The Virginia Declaration of Rights § 1 (1776), reprinted in
5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 70 (P.B. Kurland & R. Lerner ed. 1987).
148. In Locke's words:
[F]reedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to
live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the
legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all
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discussed whether or not they were free in some respect or
another, what they usually had in mind was whether or not a
particular law was valid, i.e., was a law that the government had
authority to pass.' 49 So far as religious freedom is concerned,
this means that the issue at that time was not whether a law
burdened or even prohibited the practice of a person's reli-
gion, but whether the law was legitimate.' 5" In short, the free
exercise clause found in the first amendment and some state
constitutions was essentially a code phrase that meant there
were certain kinds of laws that governments could not pass. It
did not refer generally to what persons were free to do or to
refrain from doing.
A second, related point is that the idea of religious free-
dom was closely related to the social contract theory of govern-
ment, which was almost universally accepted by eighteenth
century Americans.' 5 ' According to this theory, governments
are created by and accountable to the people, and exercise law-
fully only those powers that are delegated to them by the peo-
ple through a political contract or compact. For this reason,
written contracts (constitutions) between the people and their
government that spelled out what powers the former had and
had not granted to the latter were vital. Generally the limita-
tions imposed on government were understood in terms of cer-
tain areas of life or kinds of activities over which the
things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the
inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man ....
J. LOCKE, supra note 146, at 17. For a discussion of Locke's concept of free-
dom and its significance in early America, see M. KAMMEN, SPHERES OF LIB-
ERTY: CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF LIBERTY IN AMERICAN CULTURE 19-27, 45-
46, 49-51 (1986).
149. "[L]iberty in the eighteenth century was a concept of
constitutional law .... J. REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3 (1988).
150. J.P. Reid writes:
Indeed, eighteenth-century thought about liberty was so attuned to
the existing constitution and so removed from the ideal [i.e.
theoretical] that many rights recognized today were thought of then in
opposite ways. Religious tolerance is an example. It was not just a matter
that the concept of liberty did not require that Catholics be treated
equally with Protestants. Rather, principles were so dependent on
the current constitution that a proposal to allow Catholics to be
candidates for public office in one of the ceded islands [Grenada]
could be condemned as contrary to liberty ...... an outrageous
violation of the laws of England, of the constitution of this colony,
and of the liberty of the subject."
Id. at 64 (quoting a 1772 letter to the electors of St. George, Grenada)
(emphasis added).
151. T. CURRY, supra note 144, at 97.
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government had no jurisdiction. Freedom, also, was under-
stood largely in terms of limitations on the power of govern-
ment; violations of freedom were thought to occur most
fundamentally when a government legislated in an area over
which it had no jurisdiction. 152 It was, moreover, widely
assumed that religion was one of those areas or activities about
which the people had never authorized the government to leg-
islate. Thus, the phrases "religious freedom" or "the free
exercise of religion" referred to a political condition or
arrangement that prevented the government from legislating in
matters of religion.153 The first amendment, in particular, was
a statement that the national government had no authority to
legislate in the area of religion.154
It would, therefore, have come as a surprise to the foun-
ders if they had been told that the first amendment not only
prevents the national government from passing laws in the area
of religion but requires the government to grant exemptions,
for reasons of religion, from laws that the government may lic-
itly enact. The first amendment, after all, says, "Congress shall
make no law .. ."; it does not say or even imply that persons or
churches should be exempted from otherwise valid laws.
Moreover, if the first amendment were to be interpreted as
requiring religion-based exemptions, the word "no" in the
amendment would also make no sense. As all advocates of
such exemptions admit, persons should not have a right to be
exempt from all laws that might prohibit or burden the exercise
of their religion, but only those whose application cannot be
justified by a balancing test. The first amendment, however,
was intended to state an absolute prohibition. 55 The idea of
152. M. HOWE, supra note 135, at 18, 23.
153. T. CURRY, supra note 144, at 190.
154. M. HOWE, supra note 135, at 17-22. Curry writes:
At the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Madison had stated that the
federal government had not the "shadow of a right . . . to
intermeddle with religion," and all Americans, Federalists and
Antifederalists, agreed with him. Apart from the literalist reading of
the language used in connection with establishment, not a shred of
evidence exists to verify that anyone wanted the new government to
have any power in matters of religion. . . . Ironically, what was
intended as a declaration of no power has been interpreted as
conferring some of the very power it was intended to forbid.
T. CURRY, supra note 144, at 208, 215. In this light, Pepper's attempt, supra
note 39, at 303, to derive a right to exemptions from Madison's statement
that "[r]eligion is wholly exempt from its [government's] cognizance" is
wholly misguided.
155. Pepper, supra note 39, at 304. Although Pepper correctly says that
the wording of the first amendment indicates that the protection afforded
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exemptions, in short, is simply an anomaly that does not fit
within the eighteenth century understanding of freedom and
constitutional government.
The third reason for saying that the free exercise clause
was intended to prevent only the passage of laws whose pri-
mary purpose or effect is religious in nature is the fact that in
the eighteenth century the phrase "free exercise of religion"
was used, both in laws and generally, as a synonym for the dis-
establishment of religion, although not necessarily its complete
disestablishment. After the revolution, for example, many of
the new states adopted constitutions that used the phrase "free
exercise of religion" to signify the new relationship between
church and state that was being created.' 56 At first, however,
there was little agreement on just exactly what the "free exer-
cise of religion" required or prohibited. Although it was widely
understood that it would be violated by a law forcing contribu-
tions from all citizens for the support of one church, a debate
ensued in a few states over whether it prohibited assessments
(taxes) for the support of all (Protestant) churches. Led by
religious freedom in the national Constitution was intended to be absolute,
he is wrong in saying that this means that the free exercise clause created a
right to religion-based exemptions. He is misled by the fact that although
many of the free exercise clauses in state constitutions were qualified or
conditional in nature, the free exercise clause in the first amendment was not.
In order to understand the significance of this difference, one must realize
that complete religious freedom was a gradual accomplishment. During the
eighteenth century even the principle that laws should not directly
discriminate against certain religions or persons because of their religion was
often not considered to be an absolute principle, and guarantees of religious
liberty in the state constitutions were often worded to reflect this point of
view. As a result, in various states many groups, including Catholics, Jews,
and atheists, were specifically singled out for disabilities of one sort or
another because they were thought to pose a special threat to the order or
justice of society. See T. CURRY, supra note 144, at 78-104, 157-58, 221. The
first amendment is "absolute," therefore, because it made no exceptions to
its prohibition against laws pertaining directly and primarily to religion. In
no way does this indicate that the amendment was intended to give persons
the right to be exempt from nondiscriminatory laws that they do not want to
obey for reasons of religion.
156. The first and most influential legal provision that was intended to
guarantee religious freedom was Section 16 of the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, adopted by the Virginia Assembly in 1776. It reads:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence, and therefore all men are
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the
dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice
Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.
Reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 147, at 70.
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Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Isaac Backus, and John
Leland, the opponents of such general assessments eventually
carried the day by arguing that they violated the free exercise
of religion guaranteed by their respective state constitutions.' 57
As Thomas Curry has noted:
On one Church-State topic, the support of churches,
Americans during the revolutionary period engaged in
extensive discussion and applied their theory that the
state had no power in religious matters. In the majority
of states they decided that freedom of religion applied
not only to the exercise of religion, but also to its support
.... Opponents of state support for religion regarded
such support as an establishment, but they opposed it pri-
marily as a violation of the free exercise of religion. 158
The significance of this point for our understanding of the
religion clauses of the first amendment is difficult to overstate.
It indicates clearly that the two religion clauses were not
intended to prohibit two different kinds of law, but were two
different ways of saying the same thing.' 51 Thus, one simply
cannot say that the free exercise clause was intended to prevent
government interference with religion and the establishment
clause to prevent government aid to religion. Afortiori one can-
not say that the free exercise clause was meant to protect
against indirect, unintentional restraints on the exercise of reli-
gion-in other words, that it guarantees a right to be free (for
reasons of religion) from having to obey valid laws. All one can
say for certain is that the phrase "free exercise of religion"
g
157. T. CURRY, supra note 144, at 146.
158. Id. at 191-92, 210-11 (emphasis added). Curry explains that in
Virginia the opponents "linked a general assessment not to establishment,
but to a violation of religious liberty: 'Farewell to the last Article of the Bill of
Rights! Farewell to the "free exercise of Religion"!'" Id. at 137.
159. On this point, Curry writes:
To examine the two clauses of the amendment as a carefully worded
analysis of Church-State relations would be to overburden them.
Similarly, to see the two clauses as separate, balanced, competing, or
carefully worked out prohibitions designed to meet different
eventualities would be to read into the minds of the actors far more
than was there. . . . The two clauses represented a double
declaration of what Americans wanted to assert about Church and
State. . . . Contemporaries did not, for example, distinguish
between religious oppression as falling under the ban of the "free
exercise" clause and a general assessment as being prohibited by the
"establishment"' clause.
Id. at 216-17. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 44, at 1156; Paulsen, supra note 42,
at 312-26.
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meant that "the new government had no authority whatsoever
in religious matters."
1 60
On the other hand, the preceding evidence and analysis do
not show conclusively that the free exercise clause was not
meant to guarantee a right to religion-based exemptions from
valid laws. Even if the principle of free exercise of religion was
widely used to bar laws whose purpose or effect was primarily
religious in nature, that would not mean that the principle was
used exclusively for that purpose. There is, however, no evi-
dence, or at least none that this writer has been able to dis-
cover, that the principle of religious freedom was ever used in
the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries to justify a right, natu-
ral or constitutional, to be exempt for reasons of religion from
a law whose primary purpose and effect are secular in nature.
Indeed, a study of the writings of those persons most identified
with the cause of religious freedom reveals that none of them
favored the granting of such exemptions as a matter of right
and that most of them opposed such exemptions, either explic-
itly or implicitly.
Already there is a published study of the views ofJefferson,
Madison, and Mason on the issue of exemptions: namely,
Michael Malbin's Religion and Politics: The Intentions of the Authors
of the First Amendment. 6 ' Its conclusion is that "the framers
unquestionably denied that anyone had a right to claim an
exemption from a valid, secularly based law because of a reli-
gious objection to it.' 16 2 That the framers would take such a
position is only to be expected because their mentor, John
Locke, had earlier taken the same position. 163 Malbin's work,
however, is not conclusive on the issue, because it is incom-
plete in two respects. First, it fails to do justice to Madison's
insistence on equality of religious liberty, in the sense that
religiously motivated or affiliated individuals and organizations
160. T. CURRY, supra note 144, at 215. That this was the intent of the
first amendment did not mean that the government always adhered to the
principle. Id. at 217-21. Nevertheless, as Curry says, "[t]hat Americans
during the revolutionary period did not always carry their principles into
practice either in Church-State or other matters did not negate those
principles." Id. at 221.
161. M. MALBIN, supra note 144.
162. Id. at Preface, and also at 28, 35-40. Agreeing with Malbin are W.
BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 36
(1976); R. MORGAN, supra note 11, at 23; Little, Thomas Jefferson's Religious Views
and Their Influence on the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the First Amendment, 26
CATH. U. L. REV. 62-64 (1976).
163. See Kessler, Locke's Influence on Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom", 25 J. CHURCH & STATE 231 (1983).
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have the same rights, no more and no less, as those held by
other similarly situated individuals and organizations.' 1 4 This
principle Madison first stated in the provision on religious lib-
erty that he proposed for the Virginia Declaration of Rights.
After stating that "all men are equally entitled to the full and
free exercise of it [religion] according to the dictates of Con-
science," he immediately explained what that means: "therefore
that no man or class of men ought on account of religion to be
invested with particular emoluments or privileges; nor sub-
jected to any penalties or disabilities ... ."165 Consistently with
this principle, Madison opposed both laws that prevented cler-
gymen from serving in the legislature and laws that granted tax
exemptions specifically to churches.' 66
Malbin's study is also incomplete because it assumes that
the meaning of the free exercise clause can be found by looking
almost exclusively at what happened in Virginia and at the writ-
ings of Jefferson and Madison. Such an approach ignores what
most historians today accept, namely, that the meaning and
practice of religious freedom in America have been determined
not simply by rationalist, Enlightenment ideas, as expressed by
persons like Jefferson, Madison, Franklin, and Paine, but also
by theological ideas derived from radical or separatist Puritan-
ism and expressed by persons like Roger Williams, Isaac
Backus, and John Leland.' 67 When one looks at the writings of
these latter individuals, however, one discovers that they held
exactly the same position on religious-based exemptions as
rights that Jefferson held.
In the case of Roger Williams, for example, the evidence is
abundantly clear that he did not think the principle of religious
liberty gave religious persons or churches the right to be
exempt from obeying laws that prevented them from practicing
164. For the clearest, most convincing elaboration of this point, see
Weber, James Madison and Religious Equality: The Perfect Separation, 44 REVIEW
OF POLITICS 163 (1982).
165. 1 THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON 174 (W.T. Hutchinson & W.M.E.
Rachal eds. 1962) (emphasis added).
166. Weber, supra note 164, at 171, 182.
167. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 242 (1967); M. HOWE, supra note 135, at 1-3 1; Grenz, Church and
State: The Legacy of Isaac Backus, 2 CENTER J. 57, 73 (1983); Moore, Religious
Liberty: Roger Williams and the Revolutionary Era, 34 CHURCH HISTORY 57 (1965).
William Lee Miller even argues that dissenting Protestantism "had more to
do, over all, over time, pound for pound, head for head, with the shaping of
the American tradition of religious Liberty than did the rational
Enlightenment." W. MILLER, supra note 144, at 153.
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their religion as they thought they should. After a careful
review of Williams' writings, Edmund Morgan concludes:
[Williams] thought every government was entitled to
impose a rigorous standard of behavior in matters that
affected civility, humanity, morality, or the safety of the
state and individuals in it. . . . When conscience (even
religious conscience) led to practices injurious to the
"life, chastity, goods, or good name" of the state's sub-
jects, the state could legitimately interfere to protect
them. '
68
Perhaps just as significant as Williams' position on exemptions
is his commitment to the principle of fairness or equality.
Thus, he wrote, "If it be answered that although God's people
may doe thus against the Magistrates consent, yet others may
not, I answer.., who sees not herein partiality to themselves
... ." Likewise, Williams criticized those who wanted the rulers
to "give liberty only unto themselves, and not to the rest of
their subjects," because he disapproved of liberty's being given
"with a partiall hand, and unequall Ballance .... ""
Isaac Backus and John Leland, the two spiritual descend-
ants of Williams who had a significant hand in the establish-
ment of religious freedom in the latter part of the eighteenth
century,' 70 did not depart from Williams' general position on
religion and government, including his stand against a right to
religion-based exemptions. Concerning the latter, Leland
wrote: "Let a man's motive be what it may, let him have what
object soever in view; if his practice is opposed to good law, he
is to be punished. Magistrates are not to consult his motive or
object, but his actions."' 17 l Leland gave at least three reasons
168. E. MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND THE STATE 136
(1967). William Lee Miller makes the same point: "Williams did not accept
appeals to one's 'conscience' as a basis for exemption from a shared social
duty .... even though the conscience in question should be . .. religious."
W. MILLER, supra note 144, at 184-85. See also West, supra note 131, at 133-
60.
169. Williams, The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, in 3 THE COMPLETE
WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 395, 401-02 (1963).
170. See T. MASTON, ISAAC BACKUS: PIONEER OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
(1962); A.P. STOKES, supra note 143, at 306-10, 353-57; Butterfield, ElderJohn
Leland, Jeffersonian Itinerant, 62 PROC. AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC. 155 (1952);
Gaustad, The Backus-Leland Tradition, 2 FOUNDATIONS 131-52 (1959); Little,
American Civil Religion and the Rise of Pluralism, 38 UNION SEMINARY Q REV.
401, 408-10 (1984); McLoughlin, Isaac Backus and the Separation of Church and
State in America, 73 AM. HISTORICAL REV. 1392 (1968).
171. Leland, The Yankee Spy (1794), in THE WRITINGS OF JOHN LELAND
228 (L.F. Greene ed. 1845 & photo. reprint 1969). More specifically, he said
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for not making exceptions to laws in order to accommodate
persons who have religious reasons for seeking such excep-
tions. First, he said that under such a policy "the most atro-
cious villains would always pass with impunity."' 172 Second, he
suggested that such a policy would be difficult to administer. 1 73
Third, he argued that to get exemptions persons might be will-
ing to do or say things that otherwise they would not or should
not do or say. 174 The evidence regarding the views of Isaac
Backus on exemptions consists primarily of passages in which
.he defended Roger Williams from charges that on occasion he
had violated the religious freedom of certain persons, particu-
larly Quakers, by refusing to exempt them from compliance
with certain laws to which they conscientiously objected.' 75
Also relevant is Backus' position that immoral conduct was cen-
surable by the church, even if committed in good
conscience.'
7 6
In light of the preceding historical evidence, it is simply
not credible to say that the free exercise clause of the first
amendment was intended to give persons or churches the right
to disobey laws with impunity provided they had religious rea-
sons for wishing to do so. Granted, "the framers assumed that
the realm of religious interests and religious convictions occu-
pied a special constitutional status," 77 but this does not mean
that they favored a right to religion-based exemptions. It
that neither the motive of obedience to God nor the objective of saving one's
soul can justify the government's not punishing a person who has committed
a crime. Id. See also A Blow at the Root (1801), in id. at 237, 250.
172. A Blow at the Root, in THE WRITINGS OF JOHN LELAND, supra note
171, at 250.
173. After all, he asked, how "[c]ould the magistrate perfectly know
whether it was God, Satan, or ill-will, that prompted him [the criminal] to do
the deed?" Id.
174. Leland wrote:
Ministers should share the same protection of the law that other
men do, and no more .... To indulge them with an exemption from
taxes and bearing arms is a tempting emolument. The law should be
silent about them; protect them as citizens, not as sacred officers
Leland, The Rights of Conscience Inalienable (1791), in id. at 188.
175. Backus was an admirer, disciple, defender, and biographer of
Williams. See W. MILLER, supra note 144, at 215-16; Little, supra note 131, at
11-16. For passages where Backus defends Williams' position on religion-
based exemptions, see I. BACKUS, 1 A HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE BAPTISTs 237-38, 360-62 (1871 & photo.
reprint 1969).
176. S. GRENZ, ISAAC BACKUS-PURITAN AND BAPTIST 304 (1983);
Grenz, Isaac Backus and Religious Liberty, 22 FOUNDATIONS 354 (1979).
177. M. HOWE, supra note 135, at 160.
A RIGHT TO RELIGION-BASED EXEMPTIONS
means only that they did not want governments passing laws
that were essentially or primarily religious in nature, thus inter-
fering with the "free exercise of religion."
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that the religious liberty guar-
anteed by the Constitution is not necessarily violated (even
presumptively) whenever the government interferes with the
practice of religion by an individual or a church. If this were
not the case, then there is almost no government action that
could not at some time or another be considered a violation of
religious freedom. The founders of our country, however, cer-
tainly did not think that when they adopted the first amend-
ment they had created such a conflict-generating principle. To
the contrary, they assumed that if the government did not legis-
late on religious matters but confined itself to protecting and
promoting merely secular concerns, then the people would
have all the religious freedom they could ever need or rightly
expect.
Because the position advocated here is a minority position,
at least among constitutional law scholars, and to avoid miscon-
ceptions about what this position is, this concluding section
clarifies some of the implications of the Supreme Court's
adopting of such a position.
First, the policy that persons do not have a right to reli-
gion-based exemptions is not an extreme one, for it was held
by the Court until 1963. The Court's return to such a position,
moreover, would not unduly unsettle the law because, as noted
earlier, there have been only four decisions by the Court itself
upholding a right to religion-based exemptions, and not all of
those decisions would necessarily need to be overruled.' 78
Second, the position advocated here does not amount to
reading the religion clauses out of the Constitution, for they
are clearly needed to prevent laws whose primary purpose or
effect is to aid or harm religion or any persons or groups
178. Sherbert, for example, can be upheld because the state policy
challenged in that case actually discriminated against persons who observed
Saturdays as their Sabbath because it allowed Sunday worshippers, but no
others, to collect unemployment compensation whenever they were fired for
not working on their Sabbath. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
For this reason some justices now explain the Sherbert decision as one against
discrimination and not as a precedent for using the free exercise clause to
grant exemptions from nondiscriminatory, secular laws. See United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring); Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693, 702-12 (1986) (plurality opinion by Burger, C.J.).
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because of their religion. The fact that such laws are seldom
passed is no reason for denigrating the importance of the reli-
gion clauses or for broadening the protection afforded by
them, as though a constitutional provision is of no use unless
the government frequently attempts to violate it. Of course,
the claim that the religious freedom guaranteed by the first
amendment prohibits only laws that are essentially or primarily
religious in nature leaves many questions unanswered-includ-
ing how judges are to distinguish the religious from the secular
or determine whether a law is essentially religious or civil in
nature. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to
attempt to answer such questions, it is not unreasonable to
believe that clear and principled answers to them can be formu-
lated and consistently applied by the Court. In fact, the very
principle of religious freedom itself and the entire enterprise of
church-state adjudication are based on the assumption that
such answers are possible.' 79 To be sure, as I argued earlier,
courts can not be fair and consistent in deciding cases where
the issue is whether a person or organization has a right to be
excused from obeying a valid law. The situation, however, is
quite different when a court is deciding whether a law is essen-
tially secular or religious in nature, and thus valid or invalid in
the first place.18 0 For example, and most importantly, an ad hoc
balancing test is not used in the latter type of case. Moreover,
if religious liberty were to be narrowly interpreted, the poten-
tial for judicial abuse will be much less than it is at present,
simply because there will be fewer church-state cases to
adjudicate.
Third, the argument made here is not one for "strict neu-
trality"; that is to say, it is not an argument against all religion-
based exemptions, including those granted by legislatures as
privileges. After all, to show that no religion-based exemptions
are required by the Constitution is not to show that all such
exemptions are prohibited by the Constitution. It must be admit-
ted, however, that some of the arguments made earlier against
religion-based exemptions as rights can also be used to show
that religion-based exemptions as privileges are unconstitu-
tional. For example, if the religion clauses together require the
government to be neutral between religion and non-religion,
then how can exemptions granted by legislatures solely to reli-
179. See Little, Conscience, Theology, and the First Amendment, 72
SOUNDINGS - (1989) (forthcoming).
180. This, of course, does not imply that such decisions will always be
easy to make, but only that they will usually be understandable, defensible,
and thus legitimate.
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gious persons or groups not violate those clauses? If the foun-
ders were opposed to laws that were essentially or primarily
religious in nature, then how can any exemptions designed to
aid religious persons and groups be consistent with the original
meaning of the religion clauses?
Two answers will be briefly suggested. First, there is sim-
ply the evidence from history that indicates that some religion-
based exemptions granted by legislatures were never consid-
ered to be unconstitutional. 8 ' Typical is the founders' treat-
ment of those who conscientiously objected to fighting in wars.
Although members of the First Congress refused to adopt as
part of the proposed Bill of Rights a provision that would have
given persons "religiously scrupulous of bearing arms" a right
to be exempt from such service, they nevertheless stated that it
would be permissible for Congress to grant such exemp-
tions. ' 2 That the founders were willing to condone some reli-
gion-based exemptions granted by legislatures while at the
same time expressing opposition to laws pertaining essentially
or primarily to religion is, of course, puzzling. 18 3 Nevertheless,
it is a fact, and it allows the Supreme Court to uphold some
legislature-granted exemptions on the basis of their "unique
history," just as it did in upholding prayers in legislatures by
paid chaplains. 8 4
A second justification for religion-based exemptions
granted by legislatures is based on the principles of hardship
and neutrality. The fact is that legislatures are always crafting
exemptions from laws for categories of persons, groups, or
businesses that might be unduly harmed (e.g., put out of busi-
ness) by having to conform to those laws. If such exemptions
can be given to secular entities, the principle of neutrality or
fairness would suggest that religious entities that might suffer
special but significant hardship should also be allowed to
receive such exemptions. 185 Going beyond this, however, and
181. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
182. See W. BERNS, supra note 162, at 54-55; Malbin, Conscription, the
Constitution, and the Framers: An Historical Analysis, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 805
(1972).
183. See T. CURRY, supra note 144, at 209-22.
184. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
185. Such exemptions, however, should be given only in cases where
the hardship for which an exemption would provide relief was caused by the
government in the first place. Otherwise, the principle of neutrality could be
used to justify forms of direct aid to religion per se. In addition, such
exemptions should not be given if they would have the effect of significantly
influencing some persons' choice of religion, and they must be made
available to all religions that would experience the relevant hardship were the
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giving all religious entities a right to obtain exemptions without
giving the same right to secular entities not only is not required
by but actually violates the principle. It also causes the kind of
psychic and moral affront associated with discrimination much
more than does the occasional, special treatment of a religious
group by a legislature.' 86
Even if religion-based exemptions granted by legislatures
were declared unconstitutional, however, that would not mean
that legislatures could never grant exemptions that had as one
of their effects the lifting of restrictions on the practice of reli-
gion. The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that religious
persons and organizations can benefit from exemptions pro-
vided those exemptions are religiously neutral, i.e., provided
the exemptions are given to secular categories of persons or
groups, albeit ones that are broad enough to include religious
persons or groups within them. In most cases, these would be
exemptions granted to individuals on the basis of their sincere,
conscientious convictions, whether or not they were rooted in
religion, or exemptions granted to organizations that were
charitable or non-profit in nature. There is no reason to think
that such religion-neutral exemptions could not give just as
much protection to religious persons and churches as could be
given by religion-based exemptions.
A fourth point is that an argument against a right to reli-
gion-based exemptions is not an argument against religion.
(This point applies both to the motives of the person making
such an argument'8 7 and to the actual effects that adopting the
argument would have on the life and well-being of religion.) 88
There are at least two reasons for saying this. First, it is not
self-evident that having exemptions is good for churches or
religious individuals. From a secular point of view, they would,
law to be applied to them. Otherwise, even the moderate principle of
neutrality toward religion would be violated. See McConnell, supra note 43, at
36, 39, 41; Paulsen, supra note 42, at 341-45.
186. Garvey, supra note 42, at 212-13.
187. Pepper mistakenly assumes that persons who favor a narrow
interpretation of the free exercise clause have an anti-religion bias. Pepper,
supra note 39, at 306-07.
188. Although Walter Berns is correct in saying that the founders were
opposed to a right to religion-based exemptions, he is wrong in arguing that
the founders' "solution of the religious problem consists in the subordination
of religion." W. BERNS, supra note 162, at 26. Not only was the solution
favored by leading religious spokesmen of the day, it gave religion the
freedom to flourish even to the point of being strong enough to provide a
creative check on politics. See Cochran, Normative Dimensions of Religion and
Politics, in RELIGION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 51-61 (C.W. Dunn ed. 1989).
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of course, often be helped by having exemptions; they would
have more "earthly" resources and opportunities to do
whatever they might wish to do. From a spiritual point of view,
however, the effects of having exemptions may be negative.
Roger Williams, for example, felt that laws whose primary
effect was to aid religion or persons because of their religion
threatened the quality or integrity of "true religion" more than
did laws having the opposite effect. 189 Moreover, from the
standpoint of certain religious traditions, having to "stand up"
for the faith from time to time is beneficial to that faith. The
lesson from early Christianity, for example, is not that govern-
ment should always avoid conflicts with the church, but that the
church should always remain true to God regardless of the
demands imposed on it by the state. According to this perspec-
tive, the church's "freedom comes from faithfulness to God
and as a result can never be given or taken away by a state."190
Another reason why opposition to religion-based exemp-
tions as rights is not necessarily anti-religious is because from
the perspective of certain religions, including most Christian
churches, it is one's religious responsibility to promote good
government. From this point of view, government is ordained
by God for the purpose of carrying out certain functions bene-
ficial to humankind.' 9 ' What the government demands, there-
fore, may be more consistent with God's will than what some
church demands, and Christians, therefore, are not necessarily
called always to put what the church demands above what the
government demands. William Lee Miller has even argued,
most eloquently, that in the United States it is good govern-
ment, not religion, that is the endangered species, and that
churches too often act like other selfishly motivated interest
groups. From his point of view, therefore, the churches' con-
cern for getting exemptions from valid laws represents a very
debased kind of Christianity. 192
Finally, it should be said that the case against a right to
religion-based exemptions does not imply that government
should have unlimited power or that it never passes foolish or
unjust laws. The fact, however, that some religious persons or
189. West, supra note 131, at 141-42.
190. Hauerwas, Freedom of Religion: A Subtle Temptation, 72 SOUNDINGS -
(1989) (forthcoming).
191. See, e.g., 0. BROWNSON, THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: ITS
CONSTITUTION, TENDENCIES AND DESTINY 97 (1865 & photo. reprint 1972).
192. Miller, Responsible Government, Not Religion, Is the Endangered Species,
in GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 106, at 41-
56.
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churches have in recent years been mistreated by the govern-
ment is not enough to justify giving religious persons and
groups a right to be exempt from obeying whatever laws they
may feel are foolish, unjust, or burdensome. After all, it is not
only religious persons or groups who suffer from unwarranted
or unfair laws. Again, the question is why special protection
should be given to them alone. Of course, if and when a gov-
ernment action has a primary effect that is harmful to religion
(in general or in particular) or to persons or groups because of
their religion, then the courts, using the first amendment,
should and do afford relief to the victims of such action. In the
case of other government action to which religious persons or
groups object, even for religious reasons, the only remedies
available should be limited to those available to all citizens,
such as participation in the political process and reliance on
provisions of the Constitution other than the religion clauses.
In other words, the choice we face is not between unlim-
ited religious freedom and unlimited government power. The
crucial issue here, as it is in most cases, is where to draw the
line between two extremes. This article has argued that the
line should be drawn where the founders drew it-not because
we must do what the founders intended, but because their
understanding of religious freedom simply makes more sense
than do others, including that of the Supreme Court today. It
is more consistent with the principle of fairness, better avoids
government entanglement with religion, and is easier to apply
by the courts in a consistent and predictable manner. On the
other hand, if the Court continues to hold that the free exercise
(or establishment) clause gives persons and groups a right to
religion-based exemptions, it runs the serious risk of discredit-
ing the principle of religious liberty itself because of the mis-
deeds, judicial and otherwise, that will be committed in its
name. 193 It is precisely because religious freedom is so impor-
tant that it must not be naively, arbitrarily, or unfairly inter-
preted and applied.
193. Id. at 46.
